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The number of people in the criminal justice system has increased extraordinarily over the 
last two decades. The focus is often on rocketing prison numbers – quite rightly lambasted 
as one of the worst features of this extraordinary growth. But, so too have the numbers 
on community sentences increased over the last two decades; the probation service now 
manages some 230,000 offenders in the community. This huge increase in scope of the 
justice system come at a significant financial cost. For example, investment in prisons 
has increased by nearly 40% in real terms between 2003-04 and 2008-09, from £2.52bn 
to £3.98bn a year (�rimshaw et al, 2010). Despite this, capacity has not been able to 
meet demand, and as a result the prison system is severely overcrowded. So too in the 
community, the challenge of high probation caseloads is well known. 
As well as questions about whether the size and scope of our criminal justice system, in 
particular the custodial estate, is necessary and appropriate, to which the answer is surely 
no, there is also debate about how the government intends to financially sustain the functions 
of the justice system whilst maintaining historic low crime rates, and what the respective 
roles of the private, public and voluntary sectors should be in delivering these functions.
Private prisons were first introduced to the UK in the 1990s1 and represent part of the move 
from the 1980s onwards towards greater competition across a range of public services. 
The catalyst for prison privatisation was to address overcrowding, reduce costs and to 
some degree improve standards (Harding, 2001). The involvement of private companies in 
building, financing and operating custodial facilities has been endorsed and expanded by 
the former Conservative administration, New Labour and now the Coalition government. 
Despite being strongly against private prisons in their time in opposition in the 1990s, 
once elected, the Labour government, faced by a spiralling prison population, quickly 
announced that they would be allowing private companies to bid for the running of new 
prisons, and that existing private prisons would not be taken back into the public sector. 
A consensus had now been reached amongst the major parties in support of privately-run 
prisons. Despite this political consensus, there has been a consistent critique, including 
from academics (Teague, 2010), the penal reform lobby (Neilson, 2009) and sections of the 
media (�onbiot, 2009). 
Following this initial foray in the 1990s, the next major step towards privatization was the 
establishment of the National Offender �anagement Service (NO�S) in 2004, with the 
intention of introducing ‘contestability’ throughout the prison and probation services. The 
review by Patrick Carter (2003), on which the structure of NO�S was based, argued for 
‘greater use of competition from private and voluntary providers’ (p.5), and called for this to 
 In 1992 H�P Wolds opened under management of �4S, see www.hmpwolds.co.uk
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be extended to existing prisons. It was clear that Carter, and subsequently the �overnment, 
envisaged a much greater role for the private and voluntary sector in the criminal justice 
system, and that the introduction of NO�S was seen as a way of facilitating this.
The second important development was the announcement in 2008 that a number of 
charities were bidding in partnership with private sector companies for prison contracts. 
While the voluntary sector has long worked in both public sector and privately-run prisons, 
delivering services to prisoners, this was seen as a significant change in the landscape. 
There are now charities and private companies running prisons and delivering large-scale 
payment-by-results contracts within prisons.
Perhaps the most significant ‘step change’ has occurred over the last year or so. Although 
the majority of the UK prison estate is managed by the public sector, there are now 
currently 14 private or ‘contracted out’ prisons. Last year Birmingham was the first public 
sector prison transferred to private sector management, and the government is currently 
tendering out a further nine prisons. At the same time probation services are being radically 
reshaped. The majority of probation functions are being competed out, with advice to 
courts and the management of high risk individuals retained in public sector. Probation 
Trusts will inevitably merge to form fewer, larger entities and become commissioners of 
services at local level, although it is questionable how ‘local’ this will be. 
Clearly, cuts in public spending are a significant cause of the current quickening in the pace 
of the privatisation of the prison estate, based on the (contested) belief that privately-run 
prisons are cheaper than their public sector equivalents. As NOMS Business Plan 2012-2013 
makes clear, the stated aim of government is to drive down prison place costs (�oJ, 2012). 
The Probation Service has undergone a 19% real terms budget cut since 2008-09, and this 
pressure on cost is set to continue. 
While the ongoing debate about competition is sometimes presented as peripheral to 
the overall future of criminal justice policy, it is in fact highly significant. The issue of who 
delivers criminal justice services is important, and must be informed by full and accurate 
analysis of the benefits of different approaches. This collection of essays is intended to be a 
contribution to this debate.
In the first essay, Helen Edwards, Director �eneral of the Justice Policy �roup at the �inistry 
of Justice, which has responsibility for competition policy in the criminal justice system, 
sets out the �overnment’s views on the benefits of competition across prisons and, more 
latterly probation. She argues that competition is vital to improving performance and 
efficiency. Helen also contends that competition is central to increasing innovation and 
improving quality, a discussion followed up by several contributors, with differing views.
As part of their wide-ranging project on values, practices and outcomes in public and 
private prisons, Alison Liebling, Ben Crewe and Susie Hulley summarise their key research 
findings. Their work underlines the complexity of a debate that simply asks ‘private or public - 
which is best?’ but does point to some issues around maintaining the moral legitimacy of 
prisons and the fundamental importance of staff-prisoner relationships to every aspect of 
prison life. In a further essay Crewe and Liebling go on to examine the views of senior staff 
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from both sectors about the introduction and effects of private sector competition. They 
note that principled objections to privately-run prisons have been marginalised within the 
public sector, that the introduction of competition is seen as having been a driver of 
innovation, and, perhaps most significantly, that privatisation has had a significant impact 
on the role of staff unions. They also identify a lack of professional dialogue about policy 
changes, an issue which remains problematic for the probation review. 
We then turn to those very practitioners for their views. �ary Sturgess, former Executive 
Director of the Serco Institute, examines in more detail the benefits of contracting out 
prison provision. He breaks down the benefits into three broad categories – value-for-
money improvements, positive effects on the whole system and innovation – and argues 
that privately-run prisons are significantly cheaper than public sector prisons, despite being 
of similar quality, and that competition and contracting have resulted in improvements to 
the prison system as a whole and greater innovation.
In their chapters, �ichael Teague and Jonathan Ledger question these benefits. Teague 
argues the shift towards privatisation of justice services essentially places the aim of 
financial return above that of social justice. He also notes the impact of privatization 
across the board, including moves within the policing arena. Ledger goes on to argue that 
competition runs counter to the values of probation and would undermine cooperation 
across the criminal justice system. In contrast, Heather �unro puts forward a different 
perspective, arguing that Probation Trusts are ready for competition and will largely 
embrace the changes and their new role as commissioners. 
In the final chapter we turn to a practical application of the principles discussed. It is now 
the �overnment’s preferred model to see the private sector working in partnership with the 
voluntary sector to deliver payment-by-results services in prisons. In his essay, Chris Wright 
of Catch22 explains the operation at Doncaster prison in detail arguing that payment-by-
results and contracting out of services has driven innovation. 
The contents of these essays cover a diverse range of issues. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
given that the debate about who delivers justice services has been ongoing for decades, 
they do not provide all the answers. But it is intended that they will contribute to the 
future discussion around prisons and probation services, and what the implications are 
of the increasing involvement of the private and voluntary sectors. The value of various 
sectors should be continually evaluated to ensure that the services for both prisoners 
and offenders in the community are provided in the best possible way. These essays are 
intended to help this process.
A Changing Landscape
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CHAPTER 1
The benefits of competition in  
offender management services 
Helen Edwards
Introduction: Why Competition?
“I believe in competing services as a means to raise the quality of public services. 
This can deliver innovation, better performance and value for money. Services 
should be funded by taxpayers, but delivered by whoever is best suited to do so.”
Kenneth Clarke QC MP, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice  
(Ministry of Justice, 2012)
Over the past few decades an increasing amount of core public sector business has  
been opened up to competition. The justice system has been no exception and a number  
of initiatives have increased the amount of competition we now see in offender 
management services. 
This essay will consider competition in the current context, what the increased use of 
competition in prisons has achieved and �overnment proposals for introducing competition 
into probation services. But before starting on specifics, it is important to note that over the 
past decades there has been ongoing debate about the role of competition in the public 
sector and the greater involvement of the private, voluntary and community sectors. This 
�overnment’s approach has always been that the benefit to the users of the service and the 
wider public should be the focus of what we do rather than concentrating on who provides 
the service. Coupled with research that says public/private ownership is not the most 
important variable in determining prison quality (Liebling et al, 2011) perhaps the question 
is less ‘why competition’ than ‘why not?’ 
Competition in the current context
In 2010 the �inistry of Justice published Breaking the Cycle: Effective Punishment, 
Rehabilitation and Sentencing of Offenders (�inistry of Justice, 2010). It made the case that 
although there had been reductions in the level of re-offending over the period 2000-2009 
there was still a need for fundamental reform of the criminal justice system. ‘Despite record 
spending and the highest ever prison population,’ it stated, ‘we are not delivering what 
really matters: improved public safety through more effective punishments that reduce the 
prospect of criminals reoffending time and time again.’ 
In July 2011, responding to the reforms in Breaking the Cycle, the �inistry of Justice 
published the Competition Strategy. This document set out the �overnment’s ambition for 
encouraging greater involvement of the private and voluntary sectors in the rehabilitation of 
offenders in order to cut re-offending and improve outcomes and efficiency. This would be 
achieved by inviting private and voluntary organisations and local communities to provide 
services where they could do so effectively and at a lower cost. 
Although elements of competition had been present under the previous administration, the 
Competition Strategy was different in that it outlined a new guiding principle that 
competition would apply to all offender services not bound to the public sector by statute, 
rather than as a means to select providers for new services or to address poor performance. 
This, it argued, would ensure a clear focus on results and improved value for money. 
In the forward to the Competition Strategy, �ichael Spurr, the Chief Executive Officer of 
NO�S, described how this would work: 
“In using competition we are committed to delivering better outcomes for the 
taxpayers for less. The processes and specifications that underpin offender services 
will move away from focusing on how providers deliver a particular service, and will 
increasingly concentrate on what outcomes are required from a particular service. By 
specifying the outcome to be delivered, and allowing more freedom in how it is 
achieved, we will help providers from all sectors to deliver services in the most cost-
effective manner. In using outcome-focused competitions, we will maintain a ‘provider-
neutral’ approach on the basis that competition will stimulate providers from all 
sectors to provide innovative and better value services.” (Ministry of Justice, 2011a)
The Competition Strategy also made clear however that what the Justice Secretary referred 
to as a ‘strong, vibrant and newly empowered public sector’ would remain a key provider of 
services: 
“The public sector currently delivers the vast majority of our offender services. It has 
a wealth of experience, expertise and commitment to bring to bear on the challenges 
we face and will remain an essential provider of services. However, to achieve the 
required step-change in value for money, service reform and innovation, we will work 
with both existing and new providers from the public, private and voluntary sectors, 
with contracts awarded on the basis of whoever is best placed to deliver our 
strategic objectives.” (Ministry of Justice, 2011a)
To ensure competition was used appropriately, the Competition Strategy set out the key 
strategic principles that the �oJ would apply to competition proposals in all its business areas:
• competition activity should be focused on achieving mid to long-term savings, not 
finding the cheapest solution at the expense of quality; 
• competition should be used to deliver public sector reforms, ensuring providers are 
more effectively held to account for the outcomes they deliver; 
• providers should be involved early to identify where efficiencies could be realised in 
national or process-based functions through competition; 
• small and medium sized enterprises (S�Es) and the voluntary and community sector 
(VCS) should be encouraged to participate to drive innovation; and 
• competition should be widely applied, with public sector providers allowed to bid where we 
are competing localised services and robustly held to account where successful. 
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Prisons
It is in Prisons where the private sector and competition have been established longest. The 
Criminal Justice Act 1991 introduced competition into offender management services by 
allowing private firms to be involved in the managing and construction of prisons. This led 
to the opening, in 1992, of the UK’s (and Europe’s) first privately managed prison, H�P 
Wolds, following a competition won by what was then �roup 4. 
Since then a number of approaches have also been used to market test and performance 
test prisons. There are now 14 prisons being run by private sector providers including H�P 
Oakwood which has recently opened (in April of this year). 
Competition was extended through Prison Competition Phase 1 (PCP1) which ran between 
November 2009 and �arch 2011. The aim of this was to bring the benefits of competition 
into three areas
1) Quality improvements in delivery at the particular prisons competed, including 
delivering on �overnment priorities;
2) Significant cost savings, both within the current spending review period and across the 
15 year contracts; and 
3) Whole system reform in all prisons including modernisation in terms and conditions.
In particular there have been some interesting developments, including
• H�P Birmingham moving from public to private sector - a new step designed to deliver 
improved standards;
• H�P Buckley Hall significantly improving delivery requirements from the public sector 
including increased levels of funding drawn in from prisoners’ work;
• H�P Doncaster incorporating a payment by results pilot that will lead to reduced 
reoffending – with financial penalties if this is not achieved;
• Contracts for Birmingham, Doncaster and Buckley Hall being forecast to save over 
£200m or 16% relative to previous spend over the life of the contracts; 
• H�P Oakwood, a 1,605 place prison, providing places at the lowest operational unit 
cost in the estate at a contract price of £11,000 per prisoner per year. This compares 
with an average of £27,400 per prisoner per year. Taking all cost elements into account 
this results in the lowest direct establishment unit cost in the prison estate. What 
is especially important is that the low cost has not been achieved at the expense of 
quality. The specification for Oakwood requires standards as high as those in our 
existing prisons. This is possible in part because of the winning provider's plans for the 
innovative use of information technology in reducing costs while maintaining standards.
What is noteworthy about these results is that they are being achieved while maintaining 
the ‘provider-neutral’ approach intended to stimulate providers from all sectors. Buckley 
Hall remained under Prison Service management and Doncaster remained with Serco yet 
competition still led to the improvements outlined. Contracts for Birmingham and Oakwood 
prison were won by �4S, with Birmingham being the first example of a public sector prison 
transferring to private sector management.
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Following this successful first phase of prisons competition, Prison Competition Phase 2 (PCP2) 
was launched in October 2011 in line with the strategic principles for selecting offender services 
for competition. It includes nine prisons which, apart from H�P Wolds, are all publicly operated.
These are substantial and ambitious competitions through which the �overnment expects 
to achieve a range of benefits, not only savings. Providers will help implement important 
reforms set out in Breaking the Cycle, particularly working prisons and drug-free wings. This 
and future competitions will encourage innovation in prisons and strengthen the market in 
offender services. Again a key mechanism here is the use of payment by results with NO�S 
currently canvassing views on how such an approach might be incorporated into the core 
prison contract. 
Probation services 
In contrast to prisons, competition in the probation services is less established. The 
consultation document Punishment and reform: effective probation services was published 
by �oJ on 27 �arch of this year detailing proposals that are designed to provide a stronger 
role for public sector Probation Trusts as commissioners of competed probation services, as 
envisaged by the Offender �anagement Act 2007. 
Under these proposals, all probation services not directly provided by Probation Trusts will 
be open to competition.1 These services, together with central IT and estates contracts, 
amount to around 60% of the £1billion per year budget for community offender services. 
Those providing services under competition will be increasingly incentivised through 
payment by results to reduce reoffending.
The approach outlined in the consultation paper would enable Trusts to commission more 
locally responsive or specialist services, working with local partners such as health 
commissioners and local authorities. This is designed to encourage the participation of the 
voluntary, private and public sectors, alongside new models for delivering public services 
such as joint ventures, social enterprises and public service mutuals. This would incentivise 
Trusts and front-line staff to achieve the best use of resources across the system, using 
their greater local knowledge to deliver high quality outcomes.
Other offender services 
Aside from prison competitions, better value for money has been achieved by competition in 
the national delivery of three services - prisoner escort and custody services (PECS), the 
bail accommodation and support services, and electronic monitoring. Following the re-
competition of PECS, we expect gross cashable savings of around £30m (18%) in year one 
and £260m (20%) over the minimum seven year contract period. 
Competition has been used by commissioners to find the most suitable providers to deliver 
services in both custody and the community, including services for health, substance 
misuse and offender learning and skills. Competition stimulates a thorough examination of 
 Under the proposals public sector Trusts will retain responsibility for managing higher risk offenders and, in 
the case of all offenders, providing advice to court and making certain public interest decisions such as 
initial assessments of risk, consistent with their function to protect the public.
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services and should lead to improved delivery models. For instance, the most recent 
process to re-tender offender learning and skills services (OLASS 4) enabled a greater focus 
on employability in custody, a focus on the start and end of sentence and greater scope for 
the service to be shaped at a local level. 
Competition has also been applied to offender employment support services through the 
European Social Fund, with £142m of services covering all of England having been competed 
to date. The successful bidders cover a broad mix of service providers from all sectors who 
meet particular local market conditions. This enables expertise in providing employment 
support to offenders to be brought in from the market. Competition has diversified the type of 
provider so that it includes large and small organisations from across the private, voluntary 
and community and public sectors.
�ore evidence will become available as competition is taken further forward. We will monitor 
the implementation of competition strategy over time and add to our understanding of 
positive evidence of benefits achieved. 
Commissioning
A focus on outcomes, value for money and a substantial increase in competition is not 
possible without the ability to commission services and manage the resulting contracts 
effectively. Commissioning is also key to the delivery of services that are responsive to local 
priorities in relation to offenders’ risks and needs. 
Competition is now part of the NO�S commissioning cycle, which involves assessing the 
needs of courts, offenders, defendants, victims and communities in order to design, secure 
and monitor services to meet those needs while making best use of all available resources. 
The cycle is designed to lead to new service level agreements with public sector prisons 
and refreshed contract schedules and delivery plans with existing contracted providers of 
prisons
 
and Probation Trusts.
Understanding of the cost of efficient service delivery informs the assessment of value for 
money, enables benchmarking of existing delivery and of the potential for savings through 
competition. With understanding of costs and making use of evidence about outcomes, 
NO�S has been developing its ability to make choices about where to deploy limited 
resources to secure best possible outcomes and to inform commissioners. 
Key to commissioning, whether with the private sector or through SLAs and contracts with 
the public sector, are explicit delivery requirements which set clear minimum outcomes and 
which have been through extensive governance as part of the NO�S Specification 
Benchmarking and Costing Programme. This enables us to maintain effective services.
In conjunction with a robust Commissioning process, NO�S has continued to develop its 
contract management capabilities. This is vital to ensuring that the full benefits of competition 
can be realised and that change in requirements can be accommodated. The response to last 
August’s disturbances, for example, saw private providers of criminal justice services including 
prison escorts, electronic monitoring contractors and private prisons working flexibly to 
support the criminal justice process.
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Conclusion
The Office of Fair Trading in 2010 summarised the benefits of competition as: “a driver that 
can: place downward pressure on costs; force providers to be more focused on meeting 
customer needs; lead to more efficient allocations of resources between providers; act as a 
spur to innovation” (Office of Fair Trading, 2010).
It is with these aims in mind that competition has been introduced into offender management 
services, as part of a process of long term change and development. The range of 
organisations delivering services is increasing and will, we anticipate, develop further. 
Through wider reforms extending commissioning, competition and payment by results the 
�inistry of Justice will continue to seek value for money in pursuit of its major aim of 
reducing reoffending. 
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Background 
So far, research on private sector prisons has tended to focus on performance, management 
and budgets rather than internal cultures, practices and relationships (Harding, 2001). 
Outcomes have generally been conceived in terms of future offending or cost savings alone. 
This is despite the fact that the introduction of private sector prisons in the UK, Australia, 
and elsewhere, was in part motivated by an attempt to change internal prison practices and 
staff-prisoner relationships. �ost studies in the UK to date have relied upon secondary or 
official performance data, such as costs, suicide rates, or assaults.1 
We had reason to believe that the public and private sectors had different strengths and 
weaknesses, from our forays into private prisons during the course of particular studies on 
quality of life and suicide prevention (Liebling, 2004; Liebling et al, 2005). Findings from 
these studies indicated that the treatment of prisoners in some private sector prisons was 
more benign and respectful than in most public sector prisons (see Shefer and Liebling, 
2008). At the same time, a handful of studies have also consistently identified problems in 
the private sector related to low staffing levels, high turnover, and staff inexperience (�oyle, 
1995; James et al, 1997; NAO, 2003; H�CIP, 2007). Official reports have suggested that, 
where these problems are particularly acute, private prisons are worse than the poorest 
performing public sector establishments (NAO, 2003; see also H�CIP, 2002, 2005, 2007). 
There is considerable variation within both sectors.
We set out in 2007 to explore some of these issues in a systematic manner, through an 
independently-funded study of public and private sector corrections. The study was funded 
by the ESRC and was conducted over a three year period.
Objectives
The key aims of the research were:
1. To provide an in-depth, close descriptive account of a major experiment in the social 
organisation of prison life.
2. To provide a systematic account of management, quality, practices, values and outcomes 
in contemporary corrections.
3. To provide rigorous empirical evidence on which to base arguments about the relative 
quality and effectiveness of public versus private prisons.
4. To assess whether public or private sector prisons have advantages or disadvantages 
that make a difference to the prison experience, and that influence outcomes for 
individual prisoners.
1  Home Affairs Committee, 1997; NAO, 2003; and see Logan, 1992; although see Bottomley et al, 1997; 
James et al, 1997.
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5. To identify what the key factors in success or failure (high or low moral performance) are, 
including, for example, public or private sector management, the characteristics of staff 
and prisoners, the management approach to the prison, values held by staff and 
managers and their translation into practice.
Methods
For study 1, which was an observational, interview and survey-based study, we were given 
unlimited access to high-level operational and policy arenas over the course of the project 
(e.g. the Prisons and NO�S Boards). We jointly observed around 10 Executive and Change 
�anagement Board meetings, and meetings with the Prison Officers Association (POA),  
and we both shadowed key Board personnel over a number of days, taking full notes 
throughout. In each of the main study fieldwork prisons, we spent a considerable amount of 
time observing and interviewing members of the senior management teams. We conducted 
long, biographical interviews with 95 prison governors, directors, Area �anagers, Prisons 
and NO�S Board members, with Chief Executives and Operational Directors of the private 
prison companies, and with a few highly involved ‘outsiders’. �ost of these interviews 
lasted around 3 hours. Some had to be conducted in two parts (and in one case, three)  
and lasted between 5 and 6 hours. We discussed each interview immediately afterwards, 
had them fully transcribed, have conducted a series of thematic discussions and analyses,  
and have developed a typology of professional orientations and a framework for further 
analysis.
The interviews were focused around biographical and career experiences, values, attitudes 
towards privatisation and the current organisation and operation of the Prison Service. The 
selection process was a mixture of opportunistic, snowballing, and theoretical, but was in 
the end more comprehensive than we originally intended. No-one declined to participate, 
and the sample was a sizeable proportion of the population of senior managers working in 
senior correctional management. We deliberately included most of those who had left the 
public sector to join the private sector and any ‘returnees’. With a few exceptions, the 
interviews were jointly conducted in Cambridge, with a single respondent, as a relaxed, 
organised conversation. We received an extraordinary level of cooperation and enthusiasm 
for this part of our work, and we were made welcome to follow up interviews with 
shadowing, visits to prisons and further conversation. 
We also collected 120 senior manager surveys, which we handed out at a public sector 
Prison Service conference in 2007 and a smaller number from the private sector. The survey 
asked for agreement or disagreement with a number of items relating to social and political 
attitudes, views on punishment and rehabilitation, attitudes towards aspects of 
imprisonment (including prisoners’ rights) and the purpose of imprisonment. 
Study 2 consisted of an observational, interview-based and survey methodology in four 
matched and three additional establishments. Our original research design proposed a 
mainly ethnographic comparison of two public sector and two private sector establishments, 
carefully matched in terms of function, age, size and other relevant factors. One of the key 
aims of the study was to provide the kind of qualitative insight into cultures and practices 
that has been absent from most public-private evaluations: to observe the use of authority, 
and interview prisoners and staff about their experiences in general, the exercise of power 
Delivering Justice1
and the application of discretion; to gauge staff dispositions, and explore the relationship 
between their attitudes and behaviour; to see whether there were differences in 
management styles and structures, and to evaluate values as well as practices within  
each organisation. This qualitative component was supplemented by the collection of 
survey and official data.
Advice on which prisons were comparable was taken from senior practitioners in both 
sectors. We were seeking relatively well regarded establishments in both sectors (on the 
grounds that this would facilitate access). Following the selection process, access was 
successfully negotiated with two local prisons, H�P Forest Bank (private sector) and H�P 
Bullingdon (public sector), and two category-B training prisons, H�P Dovegate (private 
sector) and H�P �arth (public sector). The research team spent several weeks in each of 
these establishments between September 2007 and November 2008, where its members 
were given keys and allowed unaccompanied access to all areas of each prison. A 
combination of research methods was employed, including interviews with prisoners, 
uniformed staff and managers, observations of management meetings, adjudications and 
staff-prisoner interactions, and the distribution of quality of life surveys to prisoners and 
staff. Access and cooperation throughout has been generous.
Prisoner perceptions of their quality of life were gathered using a revised version of the 
�easuring the Quality of Prison Life (�QPL) survey (see Liebling, assisted by Arnold,  
2004): a 140-item self-completion evaluation instrument that asks prisoners directly about 
their experiences of staff-prisoner relationships, respect, safety, order and other aspects of 
prison life that ‘matter’, rather than relying on management information and secondary 
indicators of such variables (c.f. Logan, 1992). It provides a measurement of culture, as  
well as of outcomes such as distress and wellbeing, which we know to be correlated with 
other outcomes such as suicide (Liebling et al, 2005). The survey was revised specifically 
for the purposes of the study in response to ongoing research projects (Liebling et al, 2005; 
Drake, 2007; Crewe, 2009) which had identified new forms of ‘depth’ (Downes, 1988), 
‘weight’ (King and �cDermott, 1995) and ‘tightness’ (Crewe, 2009, 2010) in modern 
imprisonment. It was also adapted in some specific areas in the light of the early 
qualitative research, so that new dimensions such as policing and staff professionalism 
were developed. We believed that these areas of prison life - based on past research 
findings and early fieldwork – would be especially pertinent to the study. The surveys were 
administered to a random sample of prisoners from all areas of each establishment in focus 
groups of between eight and twelve. Time was made available for prisoners to discuss 
issues arising from the surveys with the research team. The views of staff were gathered 
using a Staff Quality of Life (SQL) survey developed in consultation with prison staff 
(Liebling, 2008; Tait et al, in progress). In all prisons apart from H�P Altcourse, these 
surveys were distributed and collected by the research team following a brief presentation 
to all staff present during a full staff meeting. 
Supplementary data (prisoner and staff surveys, and a small number of interviews) were 
collected at three further private sector prisons: H�P Rye Hill, H�P Lowdham �range, and 
H�P Altcourse. The inclusion of Rye Hill was opportunistic, the outcome of an invitation 
from the Office of National Commissioning to use our staff and prisoner surveys to assess 
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‘where the prison was’ at the end of its ‘rectification notice’.2 Lowdham �range and 
Altcourse were incorporated into the study primarily because prisoners in our main research 
sites consistently referred to their quality, and we were aware that our two original private 
sector prisons were not performing as well as we (and others) had expected. We recognise 
that there is therefore some asymmetry in the research design, in that data from the 
‘matched four’ have not been collected from an equal set of ‘highest performing prisons’. 
Within the four, the public sector prisons were ‘on the better side’ of the available range, 
although unlike Lowdham �range and Altcourse they were not identified by prisoners as 
outstanding examples of their type. Short, informal visits were made to two further private 
sector prisons, H�P Parc and H�P The Wolds.
The structured questionnaire data were entered and analysed using the computer software 
package SPSS. A final revised set of quality of life dimensions were developed using a 
combination of conceptual and statistical methods (Liebling et al, 2010). Theoretical 
reflection on the factors generated by the quantitative analysis led to revisions, which were 
then retested statistically. The interview data were transcribed and thematically analysed 
using the software package NVivo. In total, we collected 1134 prisoner surveys and 957 staff 
surveys, and conducted 114 interviews with prisoners and 133 with staff. 
Results
In terms of the matched pairs of prisons, the two public sector prisons generally 
outperformed their private sector comparators. �arth (public Category B Training prison) 
scored significantly higher than Dovegate (private Category B Training prison) on seventeen 
of our twenty-one prisoner quality of life dimensions, and below it on none, while Bullingdon 
(public Local prison) scored significantly higher than Forest Bank (private Local prison) on 
eight of the dimensions and below it on none. Data from the three supplementary private 
prisons complicate this picture, however. Lowdham �range (private, Category B Training 
prison) scored significantly higher than �arth on nine of the twenty-one dimensions (and 
below it on none) and Altcourse (private Local prison) scored significantly higher than 
Bullingdon on fifteen of the twenty-one dimensions (and significantly below it on none). 
Rye Hill’s scores (also a private, Category B Training prison) resembled those of Dovegate,  
i.e. they were relatively poor compared to the other training prisons. 
Both Forest Bank and Dovegate (the two private prisons in the main part of the study) 
exhibited weaknesses in the areas of policing and control, organisation and consistency, 
and prisoner personal development. At senior levels, managers in both of these prisons 
acknowledged that staff were less good at following procedures than staff in the public 
sector, that the quality of uniformed staff and middle managers was highly variable, and 
that the high turnover of staff was a major problem. �any officers and unit managers lacked 
the confidence and knowledge to deal with prisoners’ problems and referred their queries 
and applications up the institutional hierarchy. Like prisoners, some senior managers 
2 The Office for National Commissioning (ONC) was the body within the National Offender �anagement 
Service which oversaw the monitoring and performance of the private sector prisons. The ‘rectification 
notice’ was served upon the prison’s contractor (�SL) to highlight serious shortcomings in the prison’s 
performance (principally in the areas of prisoner safety and regime activities). The notice required the 
company to produce a written action plan and to address the issues identified in an operational review of 
the establishment.
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blamed the quality of staff training for these problems. The emphasis in staff training on 
interpersonal skills - and the self-conscious effort made in both establishments to inculcate 
a more positive and respectful staff culture – did not lead to our two main private sector 
prisons outperforming their public sector comparators in the areas that one might expect. 
This was particularly striking given findings from previous studies (e.g. James et al, 1997; 
Liebling, 2004). Relationships with prisoners were courteous and often friendly, compared 
to the public sector, but this is only one component of respect. Custody officers were less 
‘professional’ and were not always a conduit to meeting prisoners’ needs. ‘Being nice’ was 
not the same as ‘getting things done’.
The problems exhibited by the two main private prisons in the study were not identical, 
however. Relative to Bullingdon, the main weaknesses in Forest Bank were in two domains: 
first, in organisation and consistency; and second, in control and security, including a 
complex drug culture and its attendant problems. Prisoners recognised that staff attitudes 
were generally benign, but they were highly frustrated by the ineffectiveness of custody 
officers in meeting their needs. Dovegate shared many of these problems, but its main 
weaknesses related to staff-prisoner relationships, fairness and staff professionalism. 
Having been encouraged to tighten up control after a turbulent period, and to manage their 
boundaries more appropriately, re-empowered staff had become rather careless in their use 
of power. They had reduced their emphasis on forming meaningful relationships with 
prisoners, and the prison’s ‘re-integration unit’ (now disbanded) was generating a culture 
of fear and resentment. 
One implication of these findings is that deficiencies in private sector prisons can take 
different forms, even when their root causes – chiefly, a lack of experience and expertise 
among staff (and low numbers and light management) – are similar. In both 
establishments, uniformed staff struggled to use their authority and generate legitimate 
forms of control. In Dovegate, they tended to over-use their authority to achieve order, to 
the detriment of interpersonal relationships. In Forest Bank, staff under-used their power in 
a way that maintained good relationships but at the expense of safety and control. 
Prisoners in Dovegate and Forest Bank were often explicit in identifying staff professionalism 
as the key difference between their experiences in the two sectors. The importance of this 
dimension of prison quality is evidenced by the fact that the differences between the mean 
dimension scores of the best and worst performing prisons in our study were greatest 
within our ‘professionalism’ cluster of four dimensions. ‘Staff professionalism’ generated 
the largest difference in the study (ranging from 3.53 in Altcourse to 2.62 in Rye Hill where 
the highest possible score is 5 and 3 is neutral), ‘organisation and consistency’ the second 
largest (Altcourse: 3.08; Dovegate: 2.23), ‘fairness’ the fifth largest (Altcourse: 3.15: Rye Hill 
2.46) and ‘bureaucratic legitimacy’ the eighth largest (Altcourse 2.97; Dovegate 2.35). It is 
instructive to note that the prisons at each extreme on these dimensions were all private 
sector establishments (see further Crewe et al, 2011).
In the private sector prisons, prisoners acknowledged that many problems were caused by 
staff being naïve rather than malign. In both Dovegate and Forest Bank, officers were 
enthusiastic about their work and fairly positively oriented to prisoners. However, their 
benign intentions were impeded by their inexperience and lack of confidence. For 
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prisoners, the resulting problems made the experience of imprisonment more stressful and 
frustrating than in the public sector comparators, even though the lack of ‘edge’ among 
staff meant that it was in some ways ‘lighter’. Here, then, we see the limits to what positive 
staff cultures can achieve when there are other (‘professional’, or ‘delivery’) problems 
linked to private sector staffing.
In �arth and Bullingdon (both public sector prisons), officers were confident and 
knowledgeable, delivering regimes that were safer and more reliable than in the matched 
private sector prisons. Relationships with prisoners were fairly informal, and power was 
generally exercised fairly and confidently. However, prisoners sometimes described an 
experience of imprisonment that felt ‘heavier’ than in the private sector comparators, and 
staff could sometimes be indifferent towards prisoners. Although their interactions with 
prisoners were often highly professional, their dispositions towards them were more 
negative than those of most private sector staff. 
Lowdham �range and Altcourse combined most of the strengths of both sectors, providing 
an environment that was relatively humane, predictable and purposeful, with staff-prisoner 
relationships that appeared to be largely respectful, supportive and caring. Because the 
turnover of uniformed staff was not as high as in Dovegate and Forest Bank, wing staff had 
built up the kind of confidence, knowledge and expertise that was lacking in the weaker 
private sector prisons. Significantly though, Lowdham �range and Altcourse were least 
impressive (relatively speaking) in the domain of security and policing. It seems likely that, 
even in private prisons with experienced staff, the thin staffing levels that characterise 
profit-making institutions, and the relatively high turnover among a staff group who are less 
bonded to their occupation, may limit quality levels in certain areas. This caveat aside, it 
appears that prisons that are relatively good are relatively good in almost all respects – 
they are generalists rather than specialists. This reinforces our view that prisons are 
fundamentally relational: where staff-prisoner relationships are right, almost all aspects of 
the prisoner experience are enhanced. 
There were some differences in management practices in the public and private sector 
prisons. Private sector directors spent a higher proportion of their time managing the 
external environment and company reputation, while also trying to reinforce basic staff 
standards. Public sector governors devoted considerably more time to dealing with 
industrial relations issues and spent longer in less directed meetings. At more senior 
levels, we found greater resistance to punitive government policies within the private 
sector, for both instrumental and moral reasons. Altcourse and Lowdham �range were led 
by an impressive ‘moral dualist’ Director and by a dynamic ‘entrepreneur’ respectively (see 
further below), both of whom understood the power of ‘performance’ but directed the 
demands of targets at clearly described ends (like delivering an effective and decent form 
of imprisonment, which enhanced prisoner opportunities). 
In the senior manager study, we identified some clear professional styles, representing 
distinct approaches to the �overning task, with certain strengths and weaknesses, 
including different depths of moral vision. These were linked to personal and biographical 
characteristics and formative experiences during careers. We have defined these styles as: 
highly skilled operational; the performance-plus manager; entrepreneurs; moral dualists; 
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thinker/speakers; and those who are alienated or complacent (Crewe and Liebling, 2011). 
We found some paradoxical developments, whereby some managers with the strongest 
liberal-humanitarian commitments were leaving the public sector to work in the private 
sector, because they felt their values would be more welcome and effective there. Likewise, 
a disproportionate number of highly performing women governors had left the public 
sector, and were made to feel welcome and highly valued in the private sector. It is a false 
assumption that public sector professionals are predominantly ‘knights’ – heroic altruists 
with professional ethics – or that private sector professionals are predominantly ‘knaves’ – 
pursuing only profit under any circumstances. 
Moral dualists were the managers most sensitive to power dynamics and to the plight of the 
individual, and were arguably the most effective. They were empathic and had a ‘feel’ for 
the prisoner experience. They were articulate, intelligent and operationally astute, and had 
a passion and pride in what they did. They almost always had a clear focus on ‘delivery’, 
but they had a broader grasp of the purpose of performance targets and a clear focus on 
ends as well as means. They saw order, and targets, as for other things (such as decency); 
and saw security and relationships as mutually reinforcing rather than in conflict. 
Thinker/speakers were liberal-idealists or value intellectuals. They were often slightly 
uncomfortable with their own roles, and were sometimes uncomfortable wielding power. They 
tended not to be pragmatists and were unembarrassed by using a language of care. We found 
an old liberal style of ‘gentleman governors’, who were paternalistic and somewhat elitist, 
but were respected for their values. These practitioners embodied the moral conscience of 
the Service, and had often shaped or mentored younger, highly competent but more 
managerial governors, creating in them a broader vision. There was also a younger, less 
purist, set of liberal governors, who were less utopian, more comfortable using power, and 
less embarrassed about the prison’s security functions, but who were no less values driven. 
Two key axes emerged from our typology – values, and style. In general, the balance within 
the Service has shifted towards the security, ‘robust management’ end of the style axis, and 
away from a model which sees social disadvantage as a major factor in offending. We found 
widespread unease with some harmony values and orientations. A younger generation of 
managerialists have become so focused on ‘the figures’ that they risk alienating staff by 
demanding that they work in a ‘virtual prison’. They have a narrow model of offending and 
its treatment and may blur the boundaries between responsibilisation and punishment. 
They are uncritical and can be highly mechanical. �any liberal governors think that the 
Prison Service has moved away from ‘doing things that matter for prisoners’ and that a form 
of economic rationalism has started to dominate, where a business case rather than a 
moral case is made for interventions (and everything else). 
We have provided tailored feedback to senior management teams in six of the seven 
establishments that have been included in our comparative analysis of quality of life and 
culture in public and private prisons. In each case, we presented the main research 
findings, provided extensive documentation of the staff and prisoner results for each survey 
item, and responded to questions. We were very positively received and there has been 
considerable demand for further feedback and dissemination. Our various feedback 
activities have helped inform senior-level policy discussions about the contemporary prison 
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experience, about management culture and the relative strengths of public and private 
prisons, but clearly there are other forces at work in the making of policy decisions.
We plan to continue to use (and develop) the quality of life survey, and the project in 
general has deepened our understanding of the use of authority, the prison experience, 
prison dynamics and outcomes, and the nature of contemporary imprisonment. Together, 
the revised dimensions represent a carefully balanced conceptual framework for thinking 
about the moral quality of a prison, as experienced by prisoners. The revised ‘moral 
performance’ survey constitutes a tool for reflection and analysis, and for the ‘identification 
of symptoms’ indicating moral failings as well as strivings for legitimacy. We cannot deny 
that such strivings go on, in both public and private sector prisons. The strivings sometimes 
look more energetic in the private sector, even if aspirations are not always reflected in 
practice. We plan to continue to develop our analysis and reflect on its implications.
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Prisons are not for profit. Yeah, I was bothered about that morally. I just thought that 
prisons should be … it’s such an important sanction by the State. It’s for the State to 
decide and to manage, all that. Having said that, what’s happened is that there’s a new 
player on the field and we’ve taken notice of them. [...] The opposition have started 
playing in a different way and they’ve got a different coach, and we’ve looked across 
and thought, ‘we can’t keep losing like this, they might have some ideas, we’d better 
send a scout out to find out what they’re doing’. It’s enabled us, I think, to … I don’t 
know if it is just privatisation that’s enabled us to have a lot more courage about different 
ways of running things, or if it’s the fact we have got more standards…you know, 
there’s a new player on the field, and we’ve had to raise our game (Senior manager 73).
Apparently Lord Longford, who was of the opinion that private prisons were wrong in 
principle…visited Blakenhurst and is reputed to have written in the visitor’s book, ‘If 
I was not a man of principle I’d have to admit this was a good prison!’ (Senior manager 39)
After two years of deliberation, the High Court of Justice in Israel ruled in 2009 that privately 
run prisons are unconstitutional. According to the newspaper Haaretz (2009, 23 Nov), the panel 
of judges ruled that ‘for the state to transfer authority for managing the prison to a private 
contractor whose aim is monetary profit would severely violate the prisoners’ basic human 
rights to dignity and freedom’. The Supreme Court President declared in her ruling that the 
extraction of profit from prisoners undermined their rights and that economic efficiency was 
insufficient justification for punishment to be delegated to non-state organisations.
In the UK, meanwhile, heated debates about the ethics of privatisation have faded. The first 
privately run prison, H�P Wolds, opened in 1992, so it might be unsurprising that many 
practitioners and critics have become accustomed to the presence of private sector prisons 
and are no longer disputing first principles. There has been little independent research 
investigating the impact of the privatisation ‘experiment’ – as it was originally presented 
(Bottomley et al, 1997; James et al, 1997). In other words, neither the quality nor the 
legitimacy of privately-managed prisons has been subjected to close scrutiny in recent years 
(see Sparks, 1994). Assumptions and claims are made about the superiority and dangers of 
each sector with little empirical basis.
As part of a major study of values, practices and outcomes in public and private corrections, 
between 2007-2010 we interviewed over ninety senior managers in both sectors about their 
careers and professional orientations. �ost worked in the public sector, eighteen worked in 
the private sector (mostly after a period in the public sector) and six had returned to the 
public sector after a brief spell in the private sector. One area we probed was their views about 
the introduction and effects of private sector competition. We asked our interviewees what 
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they felt about privatisation when it first occurred (or when they first joined the Prison Service), 
and whether their views had changed. These views, from individuals who have observed 
private sector competition directly, give us a particular kind of insight into the impact and 
development of privatisation – albeit one that is by no means impartial or indisputable, and 
which ends before the recent acceleration of market testing. They also help us to assess the 
ideological commitments of an important senior practitioner group. In this chapter we 
briefly summarise the responses to such questions and analyse some of their implications. 
Recalling their initial views, most interviewees remembered feeling strongly ideologically 
opposed to private sector prisons. Only one had been philosophically committed to 
privatisation, based on a belief in small government. This was compared to around half who 
believed at the time that punishment should be a function of the state and that privatisation 
was in principle indefensible. Some acknowledged that their primary sentiment had been 
concern about their professional monopoly – ‘I saw it as interesting and slightly threatening 
in a remote sort of way’ (senior manager 52) – while a number recalled having been 
sceptical but curious. The latter feeling stemmed from a widespread recognition that public 
sector prisons were in need of radical reform:
I was interested to see how it would work out. I was sort of fairly agnostic about it. 
[...] Bearing in mind my experience at [Local prison X], where we used to treat 
remand prisoners disgracefully. I [felt] that if the private sector can actually treat the 
remand population in this more civilised way, we’ve got a lot to be ashamed of. If 
they can demonstrate they can do that, all to the good that was my early view. 
(Senior manager 39)
Several interviewees who leaned politically to the left explained, in similar terms, that they 
had found it hard to oppose private sector competition at the outset given the difficulties of 
trying to reform public sector prisons in the face of change-resistant unions: ‘I wondered 
whether it would work [but] I was very conscious at the time that we weren’t running prisons 
well, and that we were in thrall to the POA in particular’ (Senior manager 12).
This attitude of pragmatic acceptance was more dominant in current views of private 
prisons. The majority of interviewees who had worked in prisons during the last decade had 
become accustomed to privatisation and persuaded of its value. �ost believed that 
competition had driven up standards in the public sector, and argued that the threat of 
privatisation was the only tool that could have done so, particularly given the power of the 
Prison Officers’ Association:
I think [privatisation has] been really helpful in raising our game, and it’s been a 
wake-up call in terms of suddenly realising that…this may not be a job for life, that 
we’ve actually got to deliver and if we don’t there’s people over there who will do it 
instead, and I think that’s been generally good. (Senior manager 65)
I don’t think the improvements we’ve seen in the Prison Service in delivery and 
outputs would have happened without the threat of privatisation, and without the 
reality of privatisation, because we wouldn’t have done it ourselves. We wouldn’t 
have had the motivation, there would’ve been no incentive. (Senior manager 18)
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Among this group were a number of people who had originally been fiercely hostile to 
private sector involvement in prisons, but had moderated their position over time:
All I saw [at first] was making money out of something that you shouldn’t make 
money out of. I think I’ve probably changed towards something that like … if you 
deliver the outcomes and they’re well defined and they are fair, then it doesn’t really 
matter who delivers it. I’ve got still an underlying unease that the profit will always 
be higher on the agenda than anything else. But I’m not anything like as extreme in 
my view as I was when I started. (Senior manager 83)
�any interviewees had revised their views through direct exposure to the private sector  
and its practices: visits to good private prisons (Altcourse was mentioned on several 
occasions, as were the Wolds and Lowdham �range), participation in bids to capture 
prisons for the public sector (e.g. for Blakenhurst or Buckley Hall), secondments to the 
private sector, and so on. As the following quotation illustrates, these practitioners felt  
that their moral misgivings were unsustainable given the quality of some private sector 
establishments: 
When privatisation first came on the scene do you remember having views about it?
Oh �od yes, [I] marched against it.
Did your views change?
Yes, because I grew up and because, you know, you’ve got the health service with 
things being contracted out, it became more of a way of life. [And] because I 
accepted an invitation to go round Altcourse. And Altcourse was a lot better than 
what we were doing and I thought ‘well how can you say actually ... my philosophical 
principles mean that I don’t think it’s good for you - prisoner - to go to a good prison? 
Philosophically it’s better for you to go to this rat-infested shite-hole - morally it’s 
better for you, and I hope that keeps you warm at night’. It wasn’t just the fact the 
place was clean and shiny and whatever. There was more respect in it; people spoke 
to each other more as people. (Senior manager 32)
I spent a lot of time visiting [private] prisons, and I just couldn’t escape the reality 
that they were good. [...] You just couldn’t get away from the fact that prisoner after 
prisoner after prisoner said ‘why aren’t I treated like this [in the public sector]?’ [...] 
The bottom line, I always used to think, is if - god forbid - my son had got into 
trouble, I’d have rather he was in a private prison. (Senior manager 13)
This form of reasoning – that prisoner outcomes should take precedence over other 
considerations – was espoused by a number of practitioners, and illustrated an apparent 
paradox. �any of the most politically progressive and humanitarian governors were now 
working in the private sector, having left the public sector because they were frustrated 
with the slow pace of public sector reform. They wanted the opportunity to run prisons with 
more humane cultures and less union resistance. �iven that these practitioners often 
retained moral qualms about companies profiting from punishment, their position was 
rather uncomfortable, as some acknowledged. But it was a little more comfortable to be a 
left-leaning public sector manager who disapproved of privately run prisons in theory while 
welcoming their impact in practice:
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I could never work for a private sector company, and that position has never 
changed. What has changed is a recognition that, without the competition, I don’t 
think we could have made the gains that we have made in the Prison Service at 
anything like the speed we’ve been able to make them. I absolutely regret that. I 
think that says a great deal about public sector expectations and management, and 
an awful lot about public sector staff actually. [...] With a heavy heart, I don’t think 
there’s any way that we could’ve got some of the changes that we’ve got without the 
threat of private sector competition - which gives a wonderful dilemma about 
whether you should’ve done it really, doesn’t it? (Senior manager 23)
Interestingly though, while the accepted view among most public sector senior managers 
was that competition had been necessary to accelerate public sector improvement, most 
did not experience this as morally problematic. Their foremost consideration was delivery: 
‘I’m not uncomfortable with it as a tax payer or as a member of society. As long as what is 
being delivered is appropriate, it shouldn’t really matter too much whether it’s public or it’s 
in the private sector, it doesn’t bother me too much’ (senior manager 1). �oral arguments 
were considered less important than quality, effectiveness and value for money: ‘if it is 
cheaper and does the job, what’s the problem? If the taxpayer can get the same job done 
for less money, then great, does it matter who is providing it?’ (senior manager 63). The new 
‘moral’ discourse of ‘taxpayers’ money’ was powerful in the reasoning of many practitioners. 
�any considered public sector profligacy as serious a problem as private sector profit. 
Some interviewees objected to private sector competition primarily in the sense that they 
felt that the playing field was uneven (practitioners in both sectors used this term, each 
feeling at the time that the political climate and conditions suited the other). For example, 
some public sector governors complained that while private prisons could use their 
contracts to demand more money when they were asked to accommodate more prisoners, 
they had to find additional places without receiving extra resources. These were highly 
operational forms of objection. The dominant sentiment among public sector senior 
managers was one of loyalty and competitiveness - wanting to out-perform the private sector - 
rather than ideological hostility. Several interviewees felt that there were tensions between 
‘engaging with the private sector’ and ‘having to compete’, or that it was unfair that the 
public sector could not compete on senior manager salaries – leading to some ‘loss of talent’.
Few interviewees expressed clear moral opposition to private sector competition, and quite 
a few public sector managers disclosed that, at some point in their career, they had 
considered approaching the private sector or had been tempted when sounded out, 
especially as they approached retirement age. Several said that they would never consider 
working for one of the private prison companies. However, this was less often to do with 
ideological unease than because working for the public sector was an important part of 
their personal and professional identity. They felt loyal to an organisation that had nurtured 
and invested in them or were uneasy with aspects of private sector culture (specifically, a 
sense that it was too ‘smooth’ or was not totally upfront about its own weaknesses). Ethical 
objections to privately run prisons were largely seen as ‘naive’, ‘arrogant’ or ‘immature’. 
Practitioners who had maintained a stance of moral opposition were considered quaintly purist 
by most of their peers. The suggestion that there might be something disquieting about making 
profit from punishment was generally dismissed with the argument that all prison managers were 
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making a good living from prison work: ‘I’ve got no issues about organisations making money 
from this environment ... none of us are altruists entirely in this, are we?’ (senior manager 90).
Such dismissals illustrate the degree to which principled objections to privately run prisons 
have been marginalised within the public sector. They also point to some general features 
of contemporary senior manager culture. First, a large number of senior managers in public 
and private corrections are either a-political or do not consider political considerations to 
be relevant to their work. ‘Speaking out’ about issues such as the growing prison population, 
or about any of the complex moral and political issues regarding private sector confinement, 
is not seen as professionally relevant or appropriate. There are few forums in which critical 
voices can be expressed, and few critical voices searching for such outlets. The job is to 
‘deliver’, and while there is undoubtedly a deep commitment to improving the internal 
quality of prisons, much less attention is paid to the exterior world of penal politics (Crewe 
and Liebling, 2011, and Liebling and Crewe, in press). One danger of this is that there is 
little professional dialogue about policy changes. For example, there has been almost no 
comment on the transfer of adjudicating powers within private prisons from state employees 
(‘controllers’ or ‘monitors’, who are based in the establishments to ensure that they stick to 
contract) to private sector directors, despite the importance of this division of labour in 
maintaining the symbolic distinction between the allocation and administration of 
punishment (�oyle, 2001). Some controllers have commented that it is sensible for private 
sector directors to take over adjudications, because this gives operational managers more 
grip on the prison and a better sense of its ‘temperature’. Again, this reflects a prioritisation 
of pragmatic considerations over important matters of legitimacy and accountability.
Second, relying on competition to push public sector staff to reform their working practices 
might work as a short-term motivator, but lasting change probably requires staff to ‘see the 
light’ as well as ‘feel the heat’ (senior manager 22). Some interviewees expressed concern 
that NO�S was using competition as a ‘stick to beat the public sector with’ rather than as a 
source of inspiration and innovation, as it had initially been conceived. This may have 
reflected the fact that, at the time of our interviews, some NO�S board members were by 
no means convinced that private prisons were always a good model for the public sector 
(there were particular concerns about safety and control in several of the private sector prisons). 
�eanwhile, using competition as a threat required that the threat remained credible. Some 
interviewees regretted that none of the existing market tests had – at that time – resulted in 
private sector takeovers of public sector prisons, fearing that staff in some of the poorest 
performing public sector prisons had become complacent, and that the private companies 
would tire of competing for contracts if they were not awarded them more often. In 2012, 
with market testing having entered a new phase, the impact is rather different: public 
sector prison staff feel that privatisation is almost inevitable in the near future, regardless 
of how well their prisons are performing, resulting not so much in coasting as resignation. 
Just as significantly, if it is the case that only the threat of privatisation has been able to 
force reform in the public sector, then this speaks volumes about public sector staff cultures 
and the chronic industrial relations problems that have beset the Prison Service. It is 
striking that, from the perspective of practitioners, the inside story of prison privatisation in 
the UK is the story of union power. It is telling that some of its most senior managers felt that 
they required the threat of market testing in order to ‘convince staff that [...] they couldn’t 
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with impunity assault [prisoners]’ (senior manager 13). According to most interviewees, 
while private sector innovation has been generally disappointing, the most important 
lessons that private prisons have demonstrated are that giving prisoners more time-out-of-
cell and calling them by their preferred names are neither difficult nor a threat to staff authority. 
In some public sector establishments, there remains considerable resistance among uniformed 
staff to these practices. In the words of one public sector governor, it remains ‘a huge battle 
... incredibly hard’ to persuade officers to address prisoners more courteously (senior 
manager 61). This battle puts a paradox at the heart of debates about prison privatisation in 
the UK, aligning many politically progressive practitioners with the private sector or leaving 
them deeply conflicted in defence of a public sector struggling to reform itself. 
The moral arguments were shifting somewhat towards the end of our interviewing period 
(December 2009) in the light of severe financial constraints that may mean that both sectors 
are forced to provide ‘custody on the cheap’. Neither sector welcomed this development, 
but few expressed concern or outrage about the increasing population figures that make 
this a requirement. Nor was there much concern that some of the characteristic weaknesses 
of the private sector that are linked to its reduced costs (i.e. reduced staffing levels) might 
end up being replicated in pared-down public sector prisons, a concern that now seems 
particularly apposite. If anything, the idea of private sector superiority went rather 
unquestioned among public sector managers.
We are only beginning our analysis of the relationship between values and practices in prison 
management. One of our early findings is that many of the most influential and effective senior 
managers in both sectors regretted the lack of ‘moral space’ available to them under current 
conditions and felt that some of the fundamental questions about ‘what prisons are for’ should 
be revisited. The goals of efficiency and effectiveness do not necessarily have to compromise 
humanitarian endeavour. But as Andrew Rutherford – former Director of the Howard League – 
suggests in Criminal Justice and the Pursuit of Decency (1993), an efficiency-utilitarian position 
can crowd out foundational questions about the aims, morality and legitimacy of imprisonment.
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CHAPTER 4
The Sources of Benefit in Prison  
Contracting
Gary L. Sturgess
Origins and Development of the British Market
Writing of convict leasing in the late nineteenth century, Woodrow Wilson asked, ‘Who can 
justify a policy which delegates sovereign capacities to private individuals? Who can defend a 
system which makes the punishment of criminals. . . a source of private gain?’ Of course, no 
one defends convict leasing as it developed in the American South in the late nineteenth 
century; and yet there are many who are ready to justify prison contracting as it emerged in 
Britain in the final decade of the twentieth century.
Prison reformers such as Lord Woolf were prepared to defend such a system, if it resulted in 
greater transparency and prisoners were treated more decently. Labour politicians, long 
opposed to private gain from public services, persisted with prison contracting in the belief 
that there were real value-for-money savings and government got the lion’s share of the 
benefit. And prisoners were pragmatic, welcoming the longer hours out of cell and 
improved living conditions that accompanied the introduction of prison contracting in 1992.
Against this backdrop, the confidence of the �inistry of Justice in its Competition Strategy 
for Offender Services in July 2011 was unsurprising:
“...competition in offender services has been shown to be effective at encouraging 
the management and workforces of existing and future providers to improve 
services, drive efficiency and deliver more innovative models of service delivery.” 
(�inistry of Justice, 2011, p 4)
The concept of prison contracting firmed into policy in late 1987 and early 1988, as the 
government of the day faced the prospect of commissioning twenty-six planned facilities 
(six then under construction). Unsurprisingly, questions of economy were being given 
serious attention, and the early lessons from prison contracting in North America, and the 
results from new contracting models used in building the new facilities in England and 
Wales, suggested there was scope for significant savings. 
However, there was much more to it than that. In 1985, Ian Dunbar, the former �overnor of 
Wormwood Scrubs, had published A Sense of Direction, expounding a radically different 
model of prison management based on ‘dynamic security’, in which staff and prisoners 
interacted closely within discrete living units, and prison officers actively managed inmate 
behaviour. That same year, a Home Office working party reported on a visit to some of the 
‘new generation’ prisons in North America founded on these same ideas. These principles 
were built into the physical design of the new prisons being commissioned at that time, 
however there was union resistance to the introduction of dynamic security, and for some 
senior officials in the Home Office, contracting offered a relatively pain-free way of 
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transforming prison culture. The publication of the Woolf Report in 1991 reinforced this new 
approach, so that with the introduction of privately-managed prisons, both commissioners 
and contractors placed considerable importance on what would become known as ‘the 
decency agenda’ (Dunbar, 1985; Home Office, 1991).
At the same time, there was widespread concern about a lack of management control within 
the nation’s prisons. Woolf criticised ‘the confetti of instructions descending from headquarters’, 
and recommended increased delegation of responsibility to �overnors. He also commented 
on the accretion of custom and practice that had resulted in working arrangements ‘of 
labyrinthine complexity’. ‘Fresh Start’ had been introduced in 1987 to increase managerial 
flexibility, but by 1991 it was seen as having substantially failed, contributing to deep 
mistrust within the workforce. While some politicians may have seen contracting as a way 
of dealing with the unions, public officials were critical of �inisters for repeatedly backing 
down on managerial reform in the face of union opposition.
And in the late 1980s, prison reform was deeply infused with a contractual paradigm. Direct 
supervision was built on the concept of ‘compacts’ with individual prisoners, explicitly 
setting out expectations and responsibilities. �overnors used quasi-contractual 
arrangements for specifying prison activity (although Woolf was critical of how it was being 
implemented). And Woolf recommended the introduction of a national system of 
performance standards, with accreditation the reward for successful establishments.
The first four contract prisons, opened between April 1992 and July 1995, were owned by 
government. Thereafter the Home Office adopted a policy of contracting the design, construction, 
financing and management of all new prisons under the Private Finance Initiative. In the 
result, the UK currently has a larger proportion of prisoners under private management than 
the United States. 
Evidence of Benefits
While policy analysts would always like more, there is reasonably good evidence about the 
relative performance of prison contracting in the UK. In the discussion that follows, this has 
been broken down into three broad categories – value-for-money improvements, system 
effects and innovation.
Value for Money Benefits
One of the most rigorous studies of public and private management, anywhere in the world, 
was conducted in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s, contrasting four privately-managed 
prisons, each with its own public sector comparators. These comparisons were made over 
four years, using a robust and consistent methodology.
Cost-per-prisoner and cost-per-place were both tracked, however because of changes in 
levels of overcrowding, cost-per-prisoner was the most reliable. On this measure, the 
contract prisons were, on average 11-15% less costly than their public sector benchmarks. 
However, this underestimated the cost differential since it failed to take into account taxes 
paid by the private providers and the full cost of public sector pensions1.
 Using cost per place – where the cost differential narrowed over time – public officials and some academics 
later concluded that competition had caused the public sector to improve the efficiency of the benchmark 
prisons. However, the impact of overcrowding over this same period was so great, that cost per place was 
not a reliable measure.
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In 1995, when the Home Office decided to contract for the next generation of prisons under 
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), the public sector comparators were based on the 
assumption that any new public prisons would be designed and commissioned by government, 
but managed by the private sector under contract. On this basis, the net present value of 
the first of the PFI prisons was a further 17% below its public sector comparator (although 
this included construction costs as well as operating costs). By the time the contract for the 
fifth PFI prison had been negotiated three years later, the cost per place for a prison of 
comparable scale had fallen by 38% from the public sector comparator for the first PFI 
prison. Not all of this cost differential can be attributed to operating efficiencies, however, 
since 60-70% of the present value of a PFI prison is attributable to operating costs, we 
might conclude that they made a significant contribution (Sturgess et al, 2007, pp 83-87).
�easurement of the qualitative performance of contested and non-contested prisons is 
more problematic. Since early 2009, the �inistry of Justice has published quarterly ratings 
to compare the performance of different prisons, public and private (replacing the flawed 
‘Weighted Scorecard’). It is based on a range of output measures, moderated by prisoner 
surveys, inspectorate reports and the subjective judgments of regional Directors of 
Offender �anagement. Results fluctuate, but on average, public and private sector prisons 
are delivering comparable results (�inistry of Justice, 2011). This is interesting, given that 
privately-managed prisons are incentivised by the performance regimes written into their 
contracts, rather than departmental targets (and performance in these ratings has no 
impact on financial returns, nor on success in competitive tenders).
However, a unitary score for each prison masks important differences between these two 
classes of establishment. A survey of prisoners conducted in 2003 by the National Audit 
Office found much higher levels of perceived respect in the privately-managed prisons 
(National Audit Office, 2003, p 24). And Alison Liebling’s research suggests that contract 
prisons have placed more emphasis on ‘relationship measures’ (respect, humanity and 
trust), while state prisons have given greater weight to ‘regime measures’ (fairness, order 
and safety). While results differ from prison to prison, her studies of prisoner attitudes over 
several decades seem to confirm this interpretation (Bottomley et al, 1997, p 32. 34; 
Liebling and Arnold, 2002; Liebling, 2004; Crewe et al, 2011, pp 94-115). 
In short, the available evidence from England and Wales seems to suggest that competition 
and contracting have delivered a broadly comparable level of service quality (albeit with 
different characteristics), at a significantly lower cost.
System Effects
One of the benefits anticipated from the introduction of competition (or the credible threat 
of competition) into a monopolistic service is an improvement in the performance of the 
system overall. Analysis of system effects in the United States, comparing the expenditure 
in different states based on their use of the private sector, has found statistical associations 
but not causal relationships (Lattimore et al, 2003; �itchell, 2003; Blumstein and Cohen, 2003).
In the UK, however, there is strong anecdotal evidence of systemic improvement as a result 
of competition and contracting. In 1997, the then Director-�eneral of the Prison Service, 
Richard Tilt, claimed to have found evidence of such an effect in the narrowing of differences 
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in cost-per-place; closer analysis suggests that this was overwhelmingly caused by increased 
crowding in the contract prisons (H� Prison Service, 1997). But Tilt was not alone. His 
predecessor, Derek Lewis, said that ‘much, perhaps most, of the progress that has been 
achieved in the public sector in the last ten years would not have been possible without the 
threat of credible competition from the private sector’ (Sturgess, 2003). And Tilt’s successor, 
�artin Narey, acknowledged on a number of occasions that contracting had been central to 
the delivery of the government’s ‘decency agenda’. The National Audit Office has also 
reported that ‘Competition has been important within the prison system for improving both           
management and conditions for prisoners’ (National Audit Office, 2003, p 7).     
The Australian criminologist, Richard Harding, also commented on the increase in 
transparency and accountability that flowed from prison contracting: ‘In the United States, 
the state of Louisiana required ACA accreditation by its private prison but not for its own 
public sector prisons. This requirement soon worked its way into the fabric of the public 
sector system’ (Harding, 2001, pp 332-333). While the drive for performance assessment in 
H� Prisons certainly pre-dates the introduction of competition, the development of 
performance measurement regimes for use in managing these contracts accelerated its 
development. And the work on ‘efficient cost’ undertaken for Lord Carter’s 2007 review of 
the English prison system was largely based on a search for comparative data for one of the 
contract prisons won back by the Prison Service in 2001 (Carter, 2007, pp 22, 36, 46).
Innovation
While the question has not been studied systematically, there is considerable anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that competition and contracting have stimulated greater innovation in 
prison management. This is most evident in the design and construction of the early PFI 
prisons, which resulted in a 45% drop in delivery times for new establishments and a 
marked reduction in construction costs (National Audit Office, 1997, pp 28, 29, 44-45). There         
was also technological innovation, with CCTV cameras, magnetic key cards and privacy locks 
in managing inmates. 
In terms of day-to-day operations, the National Audit Office concluded:
“A key innovation by the private sector has been in promoting a more constructive staff/
prisoner relationship. PCOs [prison custody officers] are encouraged to treat prisoners 
in a more positive manner, for example through the use of first names and mentoring 
schemes. The senior management of the Prison Service has been able to use the 
success of the private sector in nurturing better staff/prisoner relationships to encourage 
their own staff to adopt a similar approach” (National Audit Office, 2003, p 9).     
As noted above, contracting was deliberately used by the Home Office as a way of accelerating 
the introduction of direct supervision into prison management. The creation of an alternative 
system of prison management, with staff recruited from outside the sector, and covered by 
different unions, made it easier to introduce a radically different culture into prison management. 
Among the many changes that accompanied prison contracting, perhaps the most striking 
was the increased reliance on female prison officers. Around one-third of prison officers in 
the first contract prison were female, compared with an average in the Prison Service at that 
time of around three percent (Sturgess, 2003, p 34).   
3The Sources of Benefit in Prison Contracting
Sources of Financial Savings
If competition has resulted in the delivery of broadly comparable services at significantly 
lower cost, from where have these savings come? �ost have been delivered through a 
reduction in personnel costs, which is unsurprising since these account for two-thirds to 
three-quarters of all the costs involved in operating a prison. (�cDonald and Carlson, 2005, 
p 52; U.S. Department of Justice, 2001, p 16; Donahue, 1988, p 14; Crants, 1991, p 53)2.
There are two elements to personnel costs: unit costs (the cost of salaries and benefits per 
staff member) and staffing levels (usually measured as staff-to-inmate ratios). One of the 
few studies to provide insight into the relative contributions of these two elements was 
undertaken by H� Prison Service in the late 1990s, which found that around half of the cost 
reductions came from having fewer staff per prisoner, with the other half coming from lower 
average unit costs (Park, 2000).
Unit Costs
It is usual though not universal for contested facilities to have lower unit costs. In some 
cases, this is because contract prisons pay lower salaries; in others, it is because of less 
generous pensions and fringe benefits. Some unit cost savings clearly amount to 
productivity enhancements, the most obvious examples being the management of sick leave 
and overtime. Studies undertaken by H� Prison Service in the 1990s found that the cost of 
sick leave (per prisoner) was 53% lower in the contract prisons than in their public sector 
counterparts, differences that have persisted over time (Andrewes, 2000, p 8; Prison 
Service Pay Review �roup, 2006, p 15).
However, privately managed prisons have also reduced their unit costs by structuring their 
workforce differently. A 2006 survey by the Prison Service Pay Review Body found that the 
average basic pay for prison officers (in the public system) was 39% higher than for prison 
custody officers (in the privately managed facilities). But the authors identified important 
structural differences between the two systems:
• private companies set their terms and conditions with reference to conditions in local 
markets, while (for the most part) the Prison Service negotiated national pay scales;
• prison officers (in the public system) had much longer terms of service and many were 
near the top of their pay scale;
• the privately managed prisons had an average turnover rate of 24%, compared with 3% 
in the Prison Service – the former was higher than the average in the private sector in 
general (15%) and the latter was lower than the public sector in general (8%);
• the workforce in the privately managed prisons had a much younger age profile; and
• prison officers in the public sector had a much steeper pay progression in their early 
years of service (�C� Consulting, 2006)3.
2 The Bureau of Justice Assistance estimated 65-70% - Bureau of Justice Assistance. Donahue provided an 
estimate of 60% . The Crants have suggested a much higher ratio of 80%.
  The Prison Service Pay Review Body has not updated this research since 2006, although in 2001, the 
Prison Service relied on anecdotal comparators in its submission to that body – See H� Prison Service 
(2011) Submission to the Prison Service Pay Review Body for 2011/12, London: �inistry of Justice, 2011, 
p.41.
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Staffing Levels
If, through better physical design, service design or use of technology, prison managers are 
able to significantly reduce the number of staff required to supervise the prison population, 
this will have a major impact on costs. This relationship is widely understood among prison 
managers (Stephan, 2004, p 5; U.S. �eneral Accounting Office, 1992).
One of the most significant impacts of introducing competition into custodial services has 
been to force prison managers to explore new service designs and management regimes 
that will permit lower staffing ratios. Contract prisons have been able to operate 
successfully with lower staff-prisoner ratios for two decades, partly because of 
technological innovations, such as CCTV cameras and electronic keys, and partly because 
of regime innovations such as direct supervision and the recruitment of a much higher 
proportion of female prison officers (which has had an impact on the prison culture).
Drivers of Benefits
What is it about competition and contracting that delivers these benefits? This remains 
something of a black box, little work having been done to understand the drivers of  
higher productivity in prison contracting. The following discussion offers some tentative 
suggestions.
Contracting
Exposing a service to competition and writing a contract demands a detailed statement of 
requirement which has the effect of focusing the commissioners’ attention on the desired 
outcomes, and the desired scale and scope of the service in question. Prison directors who 
have worked in both the public and the private sectors report this as a stark difference 
between the two systems (Reddington, 2004, p 19).
Another significant difference lies in the ‘contractual shield’ that is created when a legally-
binding agreement is signed, leaving space within which managers are free to manage 
(Reddington, 2004; �athias and Reddington, 2006). The heavy cost of bureaucratic 
intervention in operational management in the Prison Service has long been recognised in 
England and Wales, and one of the contributions that contracting makes to the efficiency of 
prison administration is that it regulates the manner in which head office intervenes in the 
management of individual institutions, and it increases the autonomy of Prison Directors 
(Home Office, 2000, pp. 3, 14).
A third consequence of commissioning a public service under contract is heightened 
accountability. In the survey of contract managers conducted by the Serco Institute, a 
number of respondents commented that accountability was more personal than it had been 
when they managed similar services through the traditional model (Reddington, 2004, pp 
27-35). The Chief Inspector of Prisons made this same point in 1999, in commenting on the 
first of the PFI prisons:
[At] H�P Altcourse, being a contract prison...management response to appeals from 
the Director for help, or support, is instant, not subject to labyrinthine public sector, 
bureaucratic procedures, and it tells (H� Inspectorate of Prisons, 1999, p 8).
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Competition
Competitive tendering demands that alternative providers develop innovative solutions in a 
demanding environment, where each bid team knows that other highly experienced teams 
are at the same moment in time developing alternative solutions to the very same set of 
requirements. The tendering process is thus a period of intense research and development, 
as bid teams bring together existing technologies, processes and capabilities in new and 
innovative ways.
The threat of competition has been seen as a powerful factor in disseminating best practice 
across the Prison Service. In 2006, �artin Narey explained:
“When I visited Dartmoor in 2001, and despite my expectations being low, I was 
shocked by how poor the prison was...The POA told me bluntly that they were not 
going to change. I told them that if the jail was not transformed in twenty-six weeks, 
the public sector would no longer run Dartmoor...
In the case of Dartmoor, and at many other prisons before and since, we were able to 
obtain radically improved value for money while at the same time driving up 
standards of care and introducing new and innovative working practices. 
Improvements which might have taken years to drive through were achieved in 
twenty-six weeks, and all because staff knew that we could get someone else to run 
the prison decently and effectively if they could not or would not. In short, as a 
customer, we could shop elsewhere” (Narey, 2006).
Even where an in-house provider wins the contract, the fact that the management team has 
secured (or refreshed) its right to manage following a competitive process, bestows upon it 
a mandate for change. This may give managers the authority to renegotiate the implicit 
terms and conditions that tend to accumulate over time in mature organisations through a 
process of accretion. Organizational theorists speak of ‘psychological contracts’ which are 
regarded as essential to the effective working of a complex organisation – the written 
contract of employment is simply too cumbersome to allow management and staff to adapt 
to changing circumstances day to day. However, if they are not periodically reviewed, they 
can also result in organisational sclerosis, and management may find itself incapable of 
refreshing the organisational structure and culture over time (Conway and Briner, 2005).
Commercialisation
There are several additional benefits that may come from engaging private firms in the provision 
of prison services. International public service companies may have a greater capacity for 
transferring best practice from one jurisdiction to another. In the early history of the prisons 
market in Australia and the UK, North American firms, both prison management corporations 
and smaller firms specialising in innovative design, played a significant role in the transfer 
of learning from North America. �ore recently, British prison management companies have 
been disseminating best practice from the UK to Japan, �ermany, South Africa and 
Australia, and importing innovations from prisons they operate in these jurisdictions.
A number of writers have commented on the difficulty that the public sector has in scaling 
up effective innovations. The existence of two or more providers (public or private) within a 
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system of public administration, means that there is an intermediate structure that can assume 
the responsibility for scaling up without compromising or challenging the system overall.
Finally, there are benefits associated with employing organisations with brand names, and 
drawing on the self-interest of stakeholders with a commercial interest in that brand. In the 
UK, prison contractors are held to account both through their profit and loss statement (that 
is, through financial penalties for non-performance) and through the share price (as the Chief 
Inspector of Prisons delivers public reports on the performance of individual establishments).
Other Explanations
A Fresh Start: One study has suggested that in prisons, which tend to be extremely 
conservative institutions, change can be implemented more quickly ‘when sufficient 
numbers of new staff are transferred en masse from the training college or from another 
establishment’ (Crawley, 2004, p 11). This may be one of the reasons why competition and 
contracting seem to deliver transformation in organisational performance and culture.
Increased Diversity: Organisation theorists have also argued that a modest level of turnover 
in a system, involving the introduction of personnel who are not as deeply socialised with 
prevailing norms, has the effect of increasing exploration and improving aggregate 
knowledge. From this perspective, it may matter less that the new entrants are experts in 
the field than that they bring a different perspective. �any of the gains to the system from 
competition and contracting may come from increased diversity (�arch, 1991, p 79).
Selection Effects: It is possible that contracting selected out the ‘change vanguard’ from 
within the Prison Service, so that the contractors had access to some of the best managers 
in the system; although another way of looking at this phenomenon might be to say that 
the prison companies created ‘hot spots’ which attracted other high quality managers 
(Kelman, 2005, pp 92-93)4.
Direct supervision: Contracting was a vehicle for introducing a modified form of direct 
supervision into the UK, and it is possible that many of the benefits associated with the 
contract prisons are derived from its adoption. In the United States, direct supervision 
seems to have contributed to lower costs and reduced assaults across a number of 
institutions (Wener, 2006, pp 392-410).
Conclusion
It has long been recognised that it is competition rather than privatisation that delivers 
productivity improvements in the delivery of public services. As some of the leading North 
American scholars of prison contracting have argued, it is ‘the disciplinary power of the 
market in the long run’ that changes incentives, rather than a change of ownership (Camp 
and �aes, 2001; Nelson, 2005).
While prison contracting in the UK has not been without its challenges, the available 
evidence, quantitative and qualitative, suggests that it has delivered significant value-for-
 I am indebted to Dr John Rynne of �riffith University, in a private conversation in December 2011 for the                   
insight about hotspots.
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money improvements, and assisted in the transformation of the management culture 
across the prison system as a whole. However, as Liebling and others have argued, we still 
know far too little about the processes through which these changes took place, and if 
government wishes to derive further advantage from contestability in prison management, 
much closer study will be required.
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The UK currently has the most privatised prison system in Europe. Fourteen prisons out of a 
total of 141 prisons in England and Wales are currently contractually managed by private 
companies. Two of the 16 prisons in Scotland are also privately run. On 30 �arch 2012, 
around one in eight of the entire prison population of England and Wales (some 11,252 
prisoners out of a total prison population of 87,080) were incarcerated in privately managed 
prisons (�inistry of Justice 2012b). We already lock up a significantly higher proportion of 
inmates in private prisons than the USA, the nation that many consider to be the heartland 
of privatised incarceration. Approximately one in twelve of all US federal and state inmates 
are in private prisons1 (�laze, 2011, p 7) – a significantly smaller proportion of private inmates 
than in English and Welsh jails.
A sense of the scale of privatisation’s expansion is provided by the two newest private prisons, 
which according to Justice Secretary Ken Clarke will provide “modern facilities at reduced 
cost to the taxpayer” (�inistry of Justice, 2012a). H�P Thameside, the first of two English 
prisons to open in 2012, began operating on �arch 30. This was followed on April 24 by the 
opening of H�P Oakwood. When they reach full operating capacity, these two prisons will 
contribute an extra 2,500 spaces to the prison estate in England and Wales, and provide a 
22 percent increase in the number of private prison places. The number of privately held 
prisoners is likely to climb still higher in future, with the market testing of eight public 
prisons now in train. In the event that the private sector is successful in bidding for all of 
them, almost a quarter of our entire prison population could soon be privately managed. 
Is privatisation the answer to our overcrowded prison system? Prisons have been in the 
vanguard of the shift towards privatisation in the justice arena in the UK. In an era of acute 
fiscal tightening, private incarceration’s capacity to grow shareholder profits while 
simultaneously saving taxpayers money is presented as attractive. The funding settlement 
for prisons for the financial year 2011-12 encompassed a total budget of £1,870 million for 
public prisons and £311 million for private prisons Hansard (Hansard, 2011a). This means 
that while 12.9 percent of our prison population was privately managed, we nevertheless 
spent some 16.6 percent of the budget on private prisons.
Baroness Vivien Stern observed in 2006 that privatisation was “…mainly designed to reduce 
the unit cost of a prison place and introduce fear as an element in the management of prison 
staff. It is not in any sense an experiment in prison reform” (Prison Officers’ Association, 
 128,195 prisoners are in privately managed prisons, out of a national federal and state prison population 
of 1518104 inmates. This figure, correct as of 31 December, 2010, does not include the 748,728 inmates 
who are locked up in local jails �laze, L. E. 2011. ‘Correctional Population In The United States, 2010.’ in 
Bulletins. Washington: Bureau of Justice. A version of this essay was originally published on the Justice 
�ap website: www.thejusticegap.com
CHAPTER 5
Privatising Criminal Justice:  
A Step Too Far?
Michael Teague
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2011, p 4). Lord Carter took an opposing position on the positive impact of privatisation of 
the prison system, arguing that the introduction of competition delivered “a strong incentive 
for improvements in public sector prisons”, and helped “in driving down costs, changing the 
culture and enabling flexible staffing structures to be introduced” (Carter, 2004, p 4).
Carter’s view was shared by the architects of the Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition 
government’s so-called ‘rehabilitation revolution’. They demanded that “The old monopolies 
in the prison and probation system need to be opened up to create a far more diverse range 
of suppliers of criminal justice services”, as a Conservative policy statement from 2008 put 
it (Conservative Party, 2008, p 49). The Justice Secretary told the House of Commons that 
privatisation of prisons was no longer controversial, and asserted the existence of “almost 
a universal view in this House that we are moving on to a proper, fair, competitive basis for 
deciding how best to run prisons and at what cost, without being so obsessed about 
whether they are private sector or the public sector” (Hansard, 2011c). Clarke nevertheless 
acknowledged that this view may not be universally held outside parliament. He noted the 
development of contingency plans “in case anyone is so foolish as to start industrial action” 
(Hansard, 2011c) (which would in any case encounter legal difficulties, as prison officers, 
along with the police and the armed forces, are banned from taking industrial action).
The three private companies who manage UK prisons are �4S Justice Services, Serco and 
Sodexo Justice Services. �4S run six prisons, Serco manage five, and Sodexo are responsible 
for the remaining three. Sodexo and Serco also run one prison each in Scotland. The 
companies function in what is a competitive global market for privatised imprisonment. All 
have contributed to breaking what were labelled the “old monopolies”. Private prison 
companies represent themselves as both efficient and professional, but they are also 
highly profitable, despite functioning within the context of economic recession.
• �4S styles itself as “the world's leading international security solutions group” (�4S 
plc 2012:18). It operates in over 125 countries, employing 657,000 staff. As well as six 
UK prisons, �4S manages three secure training centres and two immigration centres. 
The company’s ‘Corporate Responsibility Report’ (�4S plc, 2012) confirms that private 
intervention is a profitable business. Its turnover in 2011 rose 4.7 percent to £7.5 billion, 
while adjusted earnings per share rose by 6 percent (�4S plc, 2012, p 1)
• Serco similarly define themselves as a leading international provider of custodial services. 
They operate four adult prisons in the UK, as well as a Young Offenders Institution and a 
secure training centre. Their adjusted operating profit in 2011 rose by 12.1 percent, while 
their earnings per share similarly rose by 12 percent (Serco, 2012, p 5).
• Sodexo Justice Services operate in 120+ sites worldwide, including four UK prisons. They 
currently work with over 30,000 offenders worldwide. Sodexo, like the other companies, 
was able to announce solid organic revenue growth of 6.4 percent and an increase in 
operating profit for the first half of fiscal 2012 (Sodexo, 2012, p 3).
Part of the reason private companies can run prisons more economically than the public 
sector may be the simple matter of salaries. Prisons and probation minister Crispin Blunt 
informed parliament in 2011 that while a typical public sector prison officer might earn 
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£27,940 pa, their private sector counterpart would expect to earn only £21,413 pa - three-
quarters of this amount (Hansard, 2011b).
The current coalition administration has emulated the previous Labour government in 
supporting private sector prisons. Privatised incarceration has prospered under the 
governments of both the right (Cameron, Thatcher, �ajor) and the centre left (Blair, Brown). 
England was the first country in Europe to use private prisons. What was then �roup 4 Remand 
Services Limited opened the UK’s first privately managed prison, H�P Wolds, in 1992. Private 
prisons were rapidly established under the government’s Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which 
allowed public projects to be funded by private capital. As Shadow Home Secretary in 1993, 
Tony Blair unequivocally opposed privatised incarceration. He avowed that “… people who 
are sentenced by the state to imprisonment should be deprived of their liberty, kept under 
lock and key by those who are accountable primarily and solely to the state” (Prison Reform 
Trust, 2005, p 2). For a brief period following Blair’s landslide victory in 1997, it appeared that 
prison privatisation might be reversed, as New Labour had insisted in opposition that they 
would return private prisons to the public sector. The then Shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw 
had insisted that it was not appropriate to make profit out of incarceration and even labelled 
private jails as “morally repugnant” (Hough, Allen and Solomon, 2008, p 82). However, 
once New Labour’s ‘modernising’ agenda gained traction, private prisons continued their 
relentless expansion. Within a decade, England and Wales had eleven private prisons.
A 2003 National Audit report found that despite some evidence of good performance by some 
PFI prisons, they performed less well in safety and security. There were relatively high levels 
of assaults, and prisoners expressed concerns about personal safety due to the relative 
inexperience of private staff (National Audit Office, 2003). A high turnover of staff contributed 
to a lack of consistency and poor continuity of care for prisoners. Sachdev (2004) found that 
UK private prison contractors reduced labour costs by slashing pay, extending hours, 
cutting holidays and downgrading pensions. 
Prisons and probation minister Crispin Blunt told parliament in 2010 that the ratio of 
prisoners to prison officers in public sector prisons in England and Wales was one officer to 
3.03 prisoners. The comparable ratio in private prisons was one officer to 3.78 prisoners 
(Hansard, 2010). This may suggest that more individualised personal intervention is available 
in public sector prisons. While the �inistry of Justice has attested that privatisation was 
necessary to “meet the specific needs of each individual offender” (�inistry of Justice, 2011), 
how these needs may be better met in privately managed prisons given these ratios is 
unclear. Private prisons have also locked up a higher percentage of their inmate population 
in overcrowded accommodation than public sector prisons every year for the past thirteen 
years. In 2010-11, the average overcrowding rate for private prisons was 31.8 percent, easily 
overshadowing the public sector average of 22.8 percent (Prison Reform Trust, 2011, p 71).
The impact of the drive to privatise has long been evident in prisons. Colin �oses, ex Prison 
Officers Association chair, has observed that “it is the state’s responsibility to imprison its 
citizens, and not profiteers” (BBC News, 2011). Jack Straw’s 1995 assertion that incarceration 
“is surely one area where a free market certainly does not exist” (Nathan, 2003, p 168) now 
rings somewhat hollow. The ethical dilemma associated with privatisation was delineated 
by Sir Nigel Rodley, the ex-United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, almost a decade 
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ago: “the profit motive of privately operated prisons … has fostered a situation in which the 
rights and needs of prisoners and the direct responsibility of states for the treatment of those 
they deprive of freedom are diminished in the name of greater efficiency.” (Rodley, 2003, p 7)
We are also now approaching the large scale privatisation of policing, with two of England’s 
biggest police forces (West �idlands and Surrey) inviting tenders for a contract which will 
allow private companies to investigate crime, detain suspects and patrol the streets. At 
£1.5bn over 7 years, the current deal makes the previous £200m contract between �4S and 
Lincolnshire police to run a police station look like chickenfeed. Should other forces 
become involved, the figure may rise to £3.5bn. What might the privatisation of policing 
involve in practice? As early as next spring, we might expect to see private companies 
running a range of police activities, including the investigation of crimes, the detention of 
suspects, the management of high risk offenders, the investigations of incidents, the 
support of both witnesses and victims, the support of both victims and witnesses, and the 
street-level patrol of individual localities.
With the tectonic plates shifting in favour of privatisation within the criminal justice system 
for both policing and prisons, it is hardly surprising that the probation service would also 
experience the impact of the drive to privatise. When a private company such as �4S 
advertises for probation officers, it is clear that a sea change is occurring within the justice 
system. Probation – notwithstanding its long history of embracing the rehabilitative ideal - 
amounts to a business worth some £820 million each year (Warrell, 2012). From Ken 
Clarke’s perspective, the government are simply “modernising the probation service so that 
we bring in more of the energy and innovation of the widest possible range of providers to 
bear on the battle against reoffending and crime”(Warrell, 2012). From the perspective of a 
private provider, with 233,000 people subject to supervision by probation staff (either on 
probation or parole), there is the potential for significant profit. 
The �inistry of Justice’s latest consultation document ‘Punishment and Reform: Effective 
Community Sentences’ (�inistry of Justice, 2012c) outlines plans to allow private companies 
and charities to manage a range of services currently provided by probation, including 
some direct supervision of offenders. Electronic tagging, too, is booming. The Financial 
Times estimated that tagging represents a £1 billion market in the UK (Warrell, 2012). The 
ubiquitous �4S (which provides around 60 per cent of the �inistry of Justice’s tagging 
technology) and Serco (which supplies the remaining devices) are heavily involved here too.
Competition for the running of criminal and community justice services – prisons, policing 
and probation – reflects the inexorable process of ideologically driven marketisation. The 
private sector, it is claimed, can recoup substantial sums of taxpayers’ money by operating 
more efficiently, more effectively and above all more economically. The coalition government 
emphasises the centrality of markets and market processes. The “rehabilitation revolution” 
is officially defined as the creation of “an offender management system that harnesses the 
innovation of the private and voluntary sectors” (�inistry of Justice, 2010, p 3), reflecting the 
government’s ideological inclination towards, and strong support of, privatisation. There is 
a shift underway to private provision in prisons, policing and probation. A relentless process 
of transforming our criminal justice system into a competitive market place in which the 
attainment of financial return, rather than social justice, is the primary driver is well underway.
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In 1992, as a youngish Probation Officer and Napo activist, I lobbied my then �P, �ichael 
Portillo, as part of the ‘Prisons are not for Profit’ campaign organised by the Prison Officers 
Association. As I recall �r Portillo, then a high flyer in the John �ajor �overnment was more 
interested in my views on the POA than the threat to justice from privatisation. Back then, 
many of us realised that the initial tendering of a handful of prisons was the thin end of the 
privateering wedge for the Criminal Justice System as a whole. The process has been a slow 
one but the cold dead hand of market testing/contestability/competition/contracting out 
(the terminology is almost endless) has inevitably reached all of the CJS including the 
Probation Service.
Whilst I will focus on the implications of competition for Probation I want to begin, as a 
relatively close observer, by reflecting briefly on the prison experience. Following the initial 
privatisation of a handful of prisons more have followed and the fourteenth private prison 
opened in April 2012. Individuals and organisations involved with the Service have 
highlighted the consequences of this process over the years. In a briefing issued in 2005 
the Prison Reform Trust raised a number of concerns about the impact of private prisons on 
those incarcerated and their staff. These included the quality of contact between staff and 
prisoners, prisoner/staff ratios and pay and conditions. In its conclusions it commented that:
“The private sector is motivated by the need to make profits, a fundamentally 
different motivation from the public sector. It inevitably leads to cost cutting and a 
desire to ‘grow’ markets.” (Prison Reform Trust, 2005)
Writing more recently, criminologist �ichael Teague has questioned the effectiveness of the 
mixed market approach to imprisonment and expressed concern about its ‘roll out’ across 
the wider CJS:
“The impact of the drive to privatise has long been evident in prisons. Competition 
for the running of criminal and community justice services – prisons, policing and 
probation – reflects the inexorable process of ideologically driven marketisation. A 
relentless process of transforming our criminal justice system into a competitive 
market place in which the attainment of financial return, rather than social justice, is 
the primary driver is well underway.” (Teague, 2012)
The Probation Service is currently under the competition spotlight following the publication 
in �arch 2012 of two �oJ consultation papers covering ‘effective’ community sentences and 
Probation Services (sic). However, this is not the Service’s first experience of contracting 
out. The disastrous IT and facilities management contracts have been well documented having 
been criticised over the years by, amongst others, House of Commons Select Committees 
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and the National Audit Office. Without getting into the detail of the chronic system failures 
of software provision, wasted public money and endless anecdotes about light bulbs sent 
aimlessly around the country to hostels the overwhelming experience has been a negative 
one. The traditional mantra that competition delivers efficiency and quality has sounded 
more than a little hollow to Probation staff. The Service has been weighed down by multi 
million pound contracts agreed by policy ‘�enerals’ ensconced safely behind lines blissfully 
ignorant of where the Front is let alone understanding what is happening there.
Currently, the Service is dealing with another imposed contracting out process that has defied 
logic and sense. The Community Payback process began early in 2011 when it was announced 
that the work across England and Wales would be put out to tender on the basis of six newly 
created ‘Lots’. It turned out that these ‘Lots’ would be something of a geographical lottery as 
Wales found itself linked with the north west of England, South Yorkshire was moved to the 
�idlands and Trusts as far apart as West �ercia and Devon and Cornwall were defined as 
regional neighbours.
Increasing chaos and confusion has followed this inauspicious start and the process has 
become mired in problems with contractual relationships, pensions and confidentiality. Some 
Trusts have not helped the situation by forming partnerships with one or other of the approved 
multinational bidders in order to compete against public sector bids (there is evidence of this 
practice developing in other tendering processes). Such alliances, unwelcome as they are, 
do appear to reflect Trust inexperience and uncertainty about the process and the underlying 
role of employers as providers and/or commissioners. All in all, it is hardly surprising that 
the Justice Committee in its report on the role of the Probation Service published last summer 
concluded that:
“The very large and incoherent groupings created for the community payback contracts 
would not be appropriate vehicles for commissioning other probation initiatives, and 
would undermine links between probation work and other participants in the criminal 
justice system, such as the police, courts, local authorities and local prisons.” 
(House of Commons Justice Committee, 2011)
The second part of the Committee’s observation is particularly pertinent in the context of 
the Trust merger talk in the �oJ’s consultation paper on effective Probation Services (see 
below). Following its election the Coalition �overnment was talking of a ‘rehabilitation 
revolution’ in its criminal justice policy. To its credit there has been some recognition of the 
urgent practical (and moral) need to reduce the prison population although, in common 
with most politicians, �inisters have tried to camouflage this view with tough talk about 
community alternatives. In �arch 2012 the Prime �inister returned from a trip to the USA 
lauding satellite tracking and complaining about ‘soft’ community sentencing. If only he 
had been listening to his own Prisons and Probation �inister who made a rather telling 
assessment of this myth just a few weeks earlier:
“There is an issue around public confidence in community sentences. The public 
may feel that a person has got away with it with a community sentence. But 
community sentences can be extremely intensive and very demanding. You are 
dealing with perception and reality.” (Crispin Blunt, 2012)
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�r Cameron’s prejudice, regrettably, appears to have infected the �oJ consultation papers 
on Probation and community sentences, the latter being full of tough talk about 
punishment in the community and support for greater use of surveillance technology (which 
contrasts with the more progressive endorsement of restorative justice principles). 
However, it is the consultation paper on Probation that sets out �overnment thinking on the 
role of competition in the future of the Service. In his foreword to the paper the Justice 
Secretary states that the consultation “further extends the principles of competition, which 
have been applied successfully to the prison estate over recent years, to more of 
community-based management.” (�inistry of Justice, 2012)
Yet what follows appears to be nothing more than a mishmash of ideas and proposals that 
are confused and, at times, contradictory. For example, it is conjectured that around 60% of 
probation work could be contracted out but that Trusts would retain key decision making 
powers and all statutory responsibilities, thus retaining liability for work which has been 
removed from their responsibility. The local knowledge of Trusts is recognised as important 
and Probation delivery structures are intended to remain consistent with local authority and 
police areas yet the argument for a purchaser/provide split in (or between?) Trusts is 
supported by encouragement of more Trust mergers. As the Select Committee identified last 
year it is imperative that Probation’s structure enables it to work consistently with other 
statutory partners in the CJS. The much heralded ‘localism’ approach appears to have been, 
at the very least, mislaid if not lost in the consultation paper.
These examples are serious enough but alarm bells ring out when we consider the 
consultation paper’s implications for probation practice. The use of the terms ‘higher’  
and ‘lower’ in relation to risk reveals, at best, ignorance of the fluctuating nature of risk  
and the constant reassessment probation staff, of all grades of responsibility, make of 
those whom they supervise. That these terms are employed to define whom the market 
might be involved in competing for is professionally irresponsible. These proposals 
threaten the continuity and consistency that underpins best probation practice and enable 
staff, even in a budget-cutting environment, to build challenging relationships with 
offenders. These professional concerns were echoed in the recent debate about the 
�overnment’s NHS Bill and one pathologist appeared to identify tensions that are just as 
relevant to the Probation Service:
“I have done some private work, but it’s just not as interesting clinically: most of the time, 
you’re just treating the “worried well”; … it’s all hips, hernias and hysterectomies. 
The NHS really comes into its own when treating the seriously ill: with the exception 
of certain excellent heart doctors who work privately, the private sector just can’t 
compete.” (The �uardian, 2012)
Clearly, Probation does not operate in a clinical setting as such but it is tempting to 
speculate what the external competition might view as the equivalent of ‘hips, hernias and 
hysterectomies’. Large multinational companies of the type interested in probation work 
are likely to be attracted by ‘safe’ interventions available on a bulk basis. If you accept that 
premise you can begin to make sense of the artificial constructs at the heart of the �oJ 
consultation: large areas or regions and distinct ‘lower’ risk work.
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In the area of practice I would also argue that competition runs counter to the culture of 
Probation, in particular the dissemination of best practice. Over the years probation staff 
have developed innovative and effective interventions such as work with those who have 
committed hate crimes, foreign national prisoners and a variety of accredited programmes, 
many originally defined under the ‘what works’ principle. All of these initiatives have been 
shared widely, not for profit but in order to improve the work of staff across the Probation 
Service. As has been witnessed in the Prison Service, competition, so often trumpeted as a 
progenitor of innovation, can have an inhibiting effect on cooperation as employers become 
jealous of what makes them ‘stand out’ in anticipation of a tendering process. �any of us 
were appalled to witness the recent debacle in South Yorkshire when Probation staff were 
temporarily excluded from local prisons due to a spat between the two services over the 
Trust’s decision to join �4S in a bid for the prison cluster. This fall out, generated by a 
competitive process, runs counter to the joined up approach to post sentence work which 
NO�S was designed to nurture and the traditional approach of the Probation Service to 
cooperative work.
The Service’s instinctive altruism has long expressed itself in the development of 
partnerships with local voluntary organisations. This is a long-standing ‘localism’ 
commitment and has demonstrated its willingness to share work cooperatively, not for 
reasons of profit or dominance, but in order to improve the range of services provided to 
those serving sentences in the community. It is an irony of tendering processes such as that 
for Community Payback that voluntary organisations are effectively frozen out with the 
consequence that some, like a handful of Probation Trusts, are forced to consider teaming 
up with multinationals in order to survive in the new world order. Despite the consultation 
paper’s praise for the work of the voluntary sector it seems likely that, in what is already a 
cash strapped climate, many groups, often working in key areas such as diversity and 
specialised needs, are at risk of disappearing. This demonstrates the lack of the so-called 
‘level playing field’ in competitive processes.
Before concluding it is important to address one of the fundamental arguments for 
promoting contracting out and competition; that of value for money and cost efficiency. The 
�oJ’s own statistics demonstrate the success of probation interventions and relative 
‘cheapness’ when compared to the cost of incarceration. The official way of recording 
reconviction rates has been subjected to many changes over recent years and this makes 
comparison difficult but broadly the re-offending rate for prisoners is 66% (even higher for 
short term prisoners) whilst the re-offending rate for those subject of probation supervision 
is 50% falling to 34% for those on specialist groups and programmes (�oJ, 2010). In annual 
average cost terms group/programme work (domestic violence £3572, sex offender £4148, 
substance abuse £2088, community payback £1982 (Hansard, 2011)) compares favourably 
with the prisoner cost of £41,636. Whilst there might be a desire to drive community 
sentence costs down these figures are hardly extortionate given the significance and 
intensity of the work undertaken and the skills provided by staff.
The cost of participating in a competition process should also not be ignored. This is 
reflected not just in simple expenditure but also in resources including staff time. It would 
be enlightening to discover how much Service money has been expended on the Community 
Payback process that is currently ‘paused’ in all but one of the Lots. �iven the ongoing and 
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significant cuts to Trusts’ budgets and the loss of experienced staff as a result of related 
redundancy processes, it is surely hard to justify the time and money to be spent by Trusts 
on competitive tendering in order to effectively ‘stand still’ in terms of current provision. 
Conclusion
It is implicit in any discussion of the role of competition in public services that there is an 
ideological debate underpinning the argument. I am aware that as the �eneral Secretary of 
a public sector trade union there will be some who will claim that ‘he would say that, wouldn’t 
he’. However, I have sought to argue in this essay that the introduction of competition when 
measured against the �overnment’s own criteria of increased quality and efficiency fails on 
both counts. It prompts agency tensions, wastes precious staffing and financial resources, 
demoralises staff, inhibits innovation and collaboration and consequently undermines 
good practice. The heavily veiled secrecy around competitive processes, under cover of 
catch-all confidentiality clauses which exclude trade unions and other interested parties, 
only reinforces suspicions about the fairness and equality of what is taking place. 
In a speech to the Howard League in 2010, I set out an alternative vision for Probation 
based on its traditional values and openness to change. Seeking recognition of its highly 
trained and skilled staff, policy commitments to representing and promoting diversity, 
established work with voluntary agencies and century long experience of working effectively 
with those who commit offences, I argued that a properly resourced Probation Service could 
play a pivotal role in decreasing the use of incarceration.
“We should make our case based on an approach that emphasises shared values 
and beliefs, cooperation rather than competition, altruism rather than profiteering 
and trust rather than suspicion.” (Jonathan Ledger, 2010)
I stand by those words today. The future of an efficient and high quality Probation Service 
should remain in its own hands rather than gambled on the uncertainty and risk resulting 
from external competition.
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CHAPTER 7
The Contracting out of Probation 
Services: Ready for Change
Heather Munro
On the 27th �arch 2012 the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Kenneth Clarke, 
published the long awaited consultation on the future of probation titled Punishment and 
Reform: Effective Probation Services alongside a review of community sentences. The 
consultation further extends the principles of competition to more community-based 
offender management and urges this process to be speeded up. There may be some who 
feel that those working in probation are not up for this challenge. I would beg to differ and 
believe that we are ready for this change.
It is worth reflecting on the recent history of probation to understand the change from 
probation as a “monopoly provider” of services. This came about with the Offender 
�anagement Act 2007 when the responsibility for the provision of probation services was 
passed to the Secretary of State and included the establishment of Probation Trusts who 
were the public sector bodies responsible for the provision of probation services. From this 
point on the Secretary of State could choose to contract with other providers for probation 
services, except in respect of “restricted probation provision” which relates to the giving of 
assistance to any court. The idea of having a wider range of providers delivering services for 
offenders is therefore not new to those of us leading in probation. 
I was Chief Executive of Leicestershire and Rutland Probation Trust and one of the ‘first wave’ 
Probation Trusts and it was always clear to me that as a Trust we should both be able to 
compete to deliver probation services and so become more business like, but also should 
commission services from a range of providers. Shortly after becoming a Trust, Leicestershire 
and Rutland competed a proportion of Community Payback resulting in a wider range of 
providers including the voluntary sector, Social Enterprises and Serco, a private sector 
provider. Other ‘first wave’ Trusts took different business approaches but still developed 
their roles as providers and commissioners, for example West �ercia Trust who worked with 
voluntary sector providers in their area to deliver offender services. What followed, however, 
was a change in direction from the National Offender �anagement Service (NO�S) to the 
operation of Trusts, with the development of a new Trust ‘test’ and contracts in which NO�S 
saw Trusts as providers and not commissioners. Both the Probation Chiefs Association and 
the Probation Association have argued consistently that Trusts should be the local 
commissioners of probation services. 
As someone who is a strong believer that the public sector has a key role in the delivery of 
probation services, I, like many Chief Executives, can still however see the value of competition. 
There is no doubt that it focuses the mind on greater efficiencies and encourages new ways 
of thinking. I suspect that in most parts of the country the prospect of the national 
competition for Community Payback has brought about greater efficiencies, though often 
the driver has been to ensure the public sector can compete and win the competition. There 
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is much that the public sector can learn about innovative delivery from the private and not 
for profit sectors.
As a result, the suggestion in the consultation document that Probation Trusts could become 
the commissioners of services is a very welcome one. With commissioning at a more local 
level there will be benefits – services should better reflect local circumstances. When the 
riots happened in London in the summer of 2011 it was important to work with partners to 
be responsive to local circumstances and yet as a provider of services the conversation 
about changes to what might be delivered was not in London Probation Trusts’ gift. 
There is also reference in the consultation about different models for oversight of probation 
services, including the potential involvement of Police and Crime Commissioners and local 
authorities. Probation Trusts work closely with local partners to deliver reductions in 
reoffending – many of the resources that are required to achieve this are in the hands of 
partner organisations, such as health and housing, so working alongside these organisations 
is not new to us. Indeed, as a local delivery organisation probation’s oversight by NO�S, a 
national organisation not aligned to local boundaries, has not always seemed the best fit. 
The opportunity to commission jointly with partners is surely the most sensible approach 
and fits with other initiatives around localism such as community budgets. From a London 
perspective, working closely with the �ayor’s Office for Police and Crime is not new. In 
September we seconded an Assistant Chief Officer to assist with the establishment of the 
new arrangements for a �ayor’s Office for Police and Crime. We are active members of the 
London Crime Reduction Board chaired by the �ayor and so closer alignment would be 
something we would be ready to test out. In other parts of the country however, where PCCs 
are not yet established and have not had the experience of managing police services the 
move to a wider remit for probation is perhaps a step to far. 
The probation consultation refers to a need to “speed up” implementation of the Offender 
�anagement Act 2007. �oving commissioning to Probation Trusts would ensure that there 
is progress on timescales. National Commissioning has been slow and cumbersome – a 
decision was made to put Community Payback to the market following the publication of 
the Competition Strategy for Offender Services published in July 2011. London was 
identified as the first ‘Lot’. There are, of course, complex issues to be addressed including 
those around pensions, particularly as the contracting authority (NO�S) is not the employer 
and so progress has been slow. If Trusts are to become commissioners there are very real 
challenges ahead, not least in sharpening competences and skills as commissioners, but 
the opportunity to deliver greater efficiencies and innovation leading to better outcomes 
though competition is one not to be missed. This approach lends itself to payment by 
outcomes: for example, Trusts could incentivise and reward through payments dependent 
on downstream savings from reduced reoffending. Re-offending rates have been improving; 
the latest reoffending figures (for the year ended �arch 2010) show that just under 36% of 
adults released from prison, or starting a court order under probation supervision reoffend 
within one year. We need to better align services to the research on what works in reducing 
reoffending and to test out new ways of working. London Probation Trust are about to test 
out Biometric monitoring of offenders as an additional tool to allow for enhanced engagement 
with those offenders who need a greater level of contact. Commissioning Trusts would have 
a role in researching and testing out new opportunities. Trusts, in their provider role, have 
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had limited capacity for such research, and indeed innovation, as most services are specified 
in detail and volumes set within the contract.
The consultation raises an issue about the size of Trusts for commissioning purposes and I 
suspect there will be a range of responses from individual Trusts about the right size and 
model. Undoubtedly a level of scale is required to compensate for the costs of commissioning, 
procurement and contract management. It would not be sensible to do this 35 times with 
the existing Probation Trusts each becoming commissioners. The configuration of the right 
model to take this forward will take time in some localities but in the case of London and 
Wales it might be possible to move more swiftly to a commissioning function and allow 
some learning to shape the future.
Perhaps the most controversial element in the consultation is what particular aspects of 
offender management services should be competed. The document presents a very clinical 
and purest view of the commissioner/provider split, insisting on a separation of provision 
for services, apart from advice to courts and the management of higher risk offenders, 
which should remain in the public sector. There are confusing aspects in the consultation 
about the delineation of “higher risk offenders” and what other aspects of managing lower 
risk offenders will remain in the public sector, such as breach and recall. Experience tells us 
that risk is dynamic and offenders cannot easily be divided into low and high risk, for 
example some offenders who are potentially high risk may be sentenced for a low risk 
offence. Other offenders may have committed very serious offences but when released from 
custody will be unlikely to ever reoffend. A high proportion of serious further offences come 
from those accurately assessed as low risk. So where the line is drawn over services 
reserved for the public sector will be contentious. 
As someone who has chosen to work in the public sector and believes there is an argument 
for retaining a public sector probation service it is good to see that this has been recognised 
in the review. The arguments for retaining key aspects of the service are several. Firstly as a 
public sector body Probation Trusts have legitimacy. Trusts carry considerable powers e.g. 
to recall offenders to prison and to breach offenders. The Justice Select Committee 
comment on this in their recent enquiry into the role of the probation service. Secondly the 
probation service has the authority of the court and parole board to manage risk and is not 
distracted by considerations of reputation when making difficult decisions with regard to 
offender risk. Probation Trusts have won the confidence of sentencers who trust the 
independence of the service. 
There seems to be more clarity about what have traditionally been known as “interventions”, 
such as offending behaviour programmes being competed and of course the wish to continue 
to compete Community Payback though not necessarily in the ’Lots’ as previously described. 
There may however be a more mature approach that could be taken to commissioning, 
based on developments in health. There are a number of commercial functions that support 
commissioning, such as market stewardship where the commissioner plays a part in 
developing the market and establishing channels by which commissioners’ requirements 
and the reasonable needs of the public, third and commercial sector supply side can be 
defined and met. With a new market in criminal justice there is also a need for 
commissioners to have a role in market development. In health two trends are emerging 
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strongly which are not always pulling in the same direction -pathway based commissioning 
and personalisation. The review will at least provide an opportunity to comment and reflect 
on the various approaches. 
Punishment and Reform: Effective Probation Services has provided a platform to debate the 
role of the public sector in delivering probation services and the way in which a wider range 
of providers can deliver services to generate efficiencies and innovation. In summary, much 
of this is welcomed by those leading probation. We are ready for change and whilst the 
devil is in the detail on which aspects of work will be competed the principles of Trusts as 
commissioners, competition to deliver efficiencies and innovation, and a method of 
payment by results are all ones I can certainly embrace. In London’s case there is a 
willingness to work more closely with the �ayor’s Office for Police and Crime to ensure our 
priorities are aligned. Whilst the proposed model for commissioning is not as forward 
thinking as might have been hoped the opportunity to develop this is welcomed. Not only 
are Probation Trusts ready for change we would welcome a more ambitious approach, such 
as the money for commissioning short term custody passing to Trusts or Police and Crime 
Commissioners. The continual tinkering with probation structures and delivery may not in 
itself deliver the drastic reduction in reoffending that could be delivered. Offenders 
sentenced to short term custody (under 12 months) who have no statutory supervision have 
reoffending rates of almost 60%. What is needed is a more radical approach to commissioning 
prison places, perhaps starting with short term custody. Probation Trusts would be a key 
partner in driving local solutions.
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In October 2011 Catch22, as part of an “alliance” with Serco and Turning Point, began to 
deliver an innovative new service at H�P Doncaster designed to improve long-term 
outcomes for prisoners and reduce reconviction rates. The new approach forms part of the 
�inistry of Justice’s Payment by Results pilots whereby service providers will be paid on the 
basis of the results they achieve. The work at Doncaster is innovative in many ways; it 
brings together private and not for profit organisations who have jointly designed a solution 
strongly influenced by a commitment to the importance of building effective and professional 
relationships between offenders and practitioners, and in ensuring the environment in 
which the services are provided is conducive to bringing about lasting changes in behaviour.
Catch22
Catch22 has a rich history dating back to the late eighteenth century. We have been in the 
field of offender rehabilitation and at the heart of innovation for over 200 years. Frederick 
Rainer who funded the establishment of the London Police Court �ission in 1876, which 
later became the probation service, was the founding father of one of our legacy organisations. 
Over the years we have delivered a wide variety of services to those caught up in the 
criminal justice system, from prevention to custody. In our current guise as a social business, 
with what we believe is a compelling social mission to help transform the lives of those we 
work with, we have enthusiastically embraced the idea that opening up the market to a 
range of providers from the state, private and not for profit sectors will ensure on-going 
innovation drives better outcomes for the community, victims and offenders. In our 
experience competition has created a structure that allows organisations with highly 
complementary strengths, expertise and shared commitments to making a difference to come 
together in support of common aims. Our work in Doncaster prison exemplifies this approach.
The Alliance
Back in 2006, in a time which might be defined as the “white heat” of the National Offender 
�anagement Service (NO�S), there was an explicit encouragement from government for 
collaboration between the large private sector providers of correctional services and 
voluntary sector organisations in order to compete for services to work with offenders. It 
was during this period that Catch22’s legacy organisation, Rainer entered into a partnership 
with Serco and Turning Point and created what we called “the alliance”. Although much of 
the original enthusiasm to open up the wider offender rehabilitation/management market 
place to competition has taken longer to come to fruition than originally anticipated the 
“alliance” has held together and secured some notable successes within the prison sector, 
including successful bids for H�P �aghull and H�P Belmarsh West. 
H�P �aghull was subsequently shelved as an early casualty of the current government’s 
austerity drive whilst H�P Belmarsh West opened at the end of �arch 2012 renamed as H�P 
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Thameside where Catch22 is providing offender management services and community re-entry 
support. Whilst establishing our footprint across the prison estate we are encouraged by the 
publication of the consultation document Punishment and Reform: Effective Probation Services 
(�inistry of Justice, 2012) which we anticipate will provide similar opportunities for innovative 
and again collaborative new approaches to service delivery within the community.
However, for the purpose of this piece we want to concentrate on the most recent success 
for the alliance: the re-tender for H�P Doncaster. A key part of the bid was the development, 
transition and operation of a payment by results offender management model tasked with 
reducing re-conviction rates by 5% with 10% of the total contract revenue at risk for non-
delivery. Success will be determined by applying a binary measure of whether any 
sentenced prisoner released from H�P Doncaster following the start of the new contract is 
re-convicted within 12 months of release. For those who argue such arrangements favour 
“cherry picking” we are working with all sentenced offenders received into Doncaster 
regardless of potential. Through our effective and congruent case management approach 
we are seeking to achieve the required results by offering a coordinated care approach and 
delivering quality services to the prisoners (more of which later).
Payment by Results
It has been claimed that Payment by Results (PBR) is the coalition government’s “big idea” 
(Haldenby, 2012). It is difficult to argue against the basic precept that payment for services 
should be linked to achieving specified outcomes. Obviously, in practice there are numerable 
challenges associated with “operationalizing” payment by result frameworks and contracts 
but it is to the great credit of the �inistry of Justice, no doubt driven by economic realities, 
that they are exploring this area with some vigour through the range of pilot programmes 
that have either been established, are in planning or in the process of being competed for. 
Inevitably there are those who opine against the concept; there are debates about what 
metrics to apply, binary versus seriousness and frequency and challenges for organisations 
where cash flow is an issue. But, if the approach is supported by “intelligent commissioning 
and contracting frameworks” alongside a corresponding relaxation in input and output 
controls and a true “black box” approach is allowed to be applied then genuine innovation 
can be brought to bear, in this instance on the challenge of reducing re-offending.
The Approach
One of the most challenging elements of our role in the alliance has been how we have 
engaged with the bidding process. Initially, in the early days of our work together roles were 
not clearly defined and to some extent there was some fighting to be heard in getting ideas 
across – bidding is a fiercely competitive process whereby there is a constant, albeit creative, 
tension between innovation, efficiency and pricing whilst ensuring that the specified 
requirements are adequately addressed. But, as the relationship developed and the 
respective skills sets of the different organisations became more widely understood real 
added value has been brought to the process. By the time of the re-tender for H�P Doncaster 
a fine-tuned process had emerged which to the great credit of the “major” player in the 
alliance, Serco, allowed for radical delivery solutions to be developed. Although, subsequent 
to the success of the bid the attention has been focused on the payment by results element 
of the contract, the significant point is that the delivery model had already emerged prior to 
the negotiations around PBR. The fact that the partnership was eager to test the approach 
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in a contractual relationship which put the providers’ revenue at risk fully endorsed the 
belief that bringing the three organisations together as a formal alliance would allow the 
complementary skills sets to drive innovation forward. 
The Importance of Relationship
These are interesting times. For many of us who have been involved in “social work” of any 
description there is an acknowledgement that the dynamic of the relationship between the 
practitioner and the service user can be critical in effecting positive change. From the early 
1990’s and the introduction of the “what works” paradigm into mainstream rehabilitation 
practice within both custodial and community settings it could be argued, albeit over-
simplifying the position, that the centrality of the relationship became subservient to the 
perceived power of the intervention. However, through the academic work of the likes of 
�cNeill (�cNeill, 2012) and Liebling (Liebling, 2005) and the emergence of desistance 
theory the importance of the practitioner’s ability to engage with the offender and the way 
in which the service is delivered has come to the fore. This theoretical and academic 
underpinning is central to the delivery model developed by Catch22 in support of the 
alliance’s work at Doncaster Prison. At Catch22 we have long held the view that success is 
determined largely by the way things are done: by creating the right kind of environment to 
deliver services; by building effective working relationship between the service user and 
the practitioner and instilling hope in those we work with that their situation can change for 
the better. This approach has been informed by Assay and Lambert’s work on the common 
factors that determine successful outcome in therapy (Assay, 1999).
One assessment, one case worker, one relationship 
The approach we have developed at H�P Doncaster provides an “end to end” management 
system that has replaced the former custody screening process which only provided a basic 
triage and signposting system of support to sentenced offenders on reception to custody. 
The new model of delivery provides a step change in the management of offenders 
throughout custody and post release, particularly for those who are serving less than 12 
months. In the past this group would have received only a basic custody and release 
planning service given that they fall outside the requirement for statutory supervision on 
release and for many they re-appear in the system in far too short a period of time. 
According to the Breaking the Cycle �reen Paper (�inistry of Justice, 2011) 61% of offenders 
serving less than 12 months are reconvicted within 12 months of leaving custody. 
Our new approach means that we are engaged at the reception point into custody. All sentenced 
offenders are met by Catch22 case managers/workers (at the start of the new contract some 31 
former Serco Prison Custody Officers and support grade staff transferred through TUPE across 
to the employment of Catch22) who complete an assessment of needs and risks and address 
immediate issues. Through a care co-ordination approach a package of support and relevant 
interventions is agreed, according to the individual circumstances of the offender. Whilst 
the case managers provide generic care co-ordination and support, specialist roles within 
the team provide additional assistance, for example in relation to complex housing issues.
What we are aiming to achieve through this model is for case managers to make informed 
decisions regarding the level of personal interaction required, taking account of the risk and 
individual needs, and to begin the process of involving other internal services and 
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disciplines in delivering the “sentence plan”. The case manager’s role is vital in winning the 
confidence of the offender and in ensuring improved co-ordination across the regime and in 
effectively sequencing relevant interventions. This coordinated approach ensures priority 
health and substance misuse issues are immediately addressed, numeracy, IT and literacy 
needs are identified and referrals prioritised to offender behaviour programmes or wider 
educational courses. Sentence planning and wider social support needs are addressed 
concurrently as part of the case management process, maintaining a focus on what is 
realistic and achievable for the offender at regular review points.
The notion of one relationship does not preclude additional input and help when required; 
it is simply designed to ensure that the offender is engaged in the process and benefits 
from the involvement of a consistent point of contact. The challenge for the model is to 
ensure that individual workers can develop and apply the necessary empathetic skills to 
encourage effective engagement.
After only six months of operating the new approach there has been a noticeable impact on 
the “total” regime of the prison and in how previously disparate functions are interacting 
and contributing to a more co-ordinated approach to the offender’s experience. There have 
been a number of specific developments which appear to be adding value to the overall 
approach. We have introduced an “alliance resettlement unit” that accommodates offenders 
from the South Yorkshire area serving less than 12 months with less than 6 months 
remaining. The men located on the unit receive additional support and advice in areas 
including benefits, budgeting, employability, thinking skills and planning for the future as 
part of an alliance led initiative the “�ake a Change” Course (�AC). We are also providing 
volunteer mentors who provide on-going support to matched offenders on their journey 
back to the community – the mentors are providing an independent link which sits outside 
the formal criminal justice system with a focus on strengthening self-belief and self-esteem. 
It is critically important that the work of the offender management unit in Doncaster is not 
delivered in isolation from the wider world and significant effort has been placed on 
developing pre-existing and new partnerships within the community. To this end we have 
co-located Catch22 case managers with police, probation and drug intervention colleagues 
in I�PACT teams across South Yorkshire in support of the Integrated Offender �anagement 
(IO�) model which in turn has improved the flow of communication between statutory 
partners and added a further dimension to the working of this integrated model. There is 
close working between �anchester College (the education provider in the prison), Working 
Links and Job Centre Plus designed to ensure that learning needs are prioritised and 
offenders are fully engaged prior to their release into the Work Programme, offering a 
continuity of employment and training support through the gate. In effect the different 
elements required to provide the foundation to successful resettlement are being bound 
together by the oversight of the case manager in collaboration with the offender.
Early Observations 
The new arrangements have only been in place since October 2011 and so it is too early to 
be able to demonstrate whether the PBR metrics are being delivered. However, what we do 
know is that there has been a steady increase month on month in the number of offenders 
engaging with the approach. In October 2011 of the 182 men released from the prison 62 
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were engaging with the programme. By January 2012 of the 183 men released 182 were 
engaging and in February 2012 191 men were released all of whom were engaging with the 
programme. With regards to released prisoners moving into education, training and 
employment as well as stable accommodation the performance figures are all moving in a 
very positive direction. These are early indications that the new approach is establishing 
itself and offering something different and apparently meaningful to the offender.
The introduction of the new approach has been facilitated by the fact that H�P Doncaster 
was already a well run establishment with a very clear ethos designed to support offenders 
re-integrate back into their communities. In particular Doncaster has developed imaginative 
and sensitive approaches to helping the men re-establish links with and maintain 
relationships with their families. This existing environment, supported by a management 
that is committed to making a difference, provided a strongly encouraging environment to 
introduce new thinking. There are many lessons to be absorbed and there are still fractures 
in the delivery model – the notion of one relationship has for logistical and resource reasons 
not fully transpired and so there is a “transfer” at the point of release to community based 
case managers with some consistency being provided by the volunteer mentor arrangements. 
But, for those being released from sentences of less than 12 months, we have built a model 
which provides, where wanted, on-going support back in the community – a significant 
advance on previous arrangements.
It is also the case that we are still in the process of creating a different culture amongst the 
newly designated case managers who in the majority of cases previously operated as prison 
custody officers. This will take time, support and training but we are starting from a strong 
base. Fergus �cNeil in his Apex Scotland Annual Lecture in 2009 (�cNeil, 2009) presented 
his work on Oral Histories of Scottish Probation. In it he illustrated the view of some of the 
former probationers he interviewed in which it became clear that the “tone” set at the 
beginning of the relationship with the probation officer was an important factor in 
determining the success of the order – feeling cared for and liked cannot be underestimated 
as motivations for wanting to change the course of one’s life. They are also important 
considerations when deciding how to respond to restrictions and boundaries. Setting the 
right “tone” and treating individuals with respect whilst holding them to account are the 
attributes we are committed to developing in our staff at Doncaster and beyond. 
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After 20 years of private prisons in the UK, the evidence on whether it has improved or 
worsened prison performance remains mixed and contested. The running of prisons 
by private companies, in particular, has resulted in years of heated debate – not least 
because the deprivation of liberty is the most severe punishment executed by the State 
and often upon the most marginalised of citizens. Furthermore, the ethical questions 
regarding the role of various sectors across the wider justice system remain controversial; 
the debate about the future of probation services and who runs offender management 
in the community is only just beginning in earnest. The outcome of the probation review 
could be a ‘game changer’ in this sense, transforming the offender management landscape 
considerably for years to come. 
In all of this, what is apparent is the dearth of evidence from prisoners themselves on 
various differing prison regimes (with the notable exception of Liebling and Crewe’s work). 
Yet we know prisoners are keenly aware of whether a particular institution has a reputation 
for fairness and what perks or procedures are granted compared to other prisons (Sparks 
and Bottoms, 1996). As the increasing desistance evidence is making clear, prisoners and 
those under probation supervision are powerful agents for their own change, if given the 
opportunity to realize this. Further work is needed on understanding offenders’ views on 
community provision, in particular the growing use of electronic monitoring and curfews, 
and how debates on legitimacy and managing by consent can be translated into this arena. 
As a final thought, perhaps it is questionable whether the private, public or voluntary sector 
prison and probation regimes can be effective in what has been described and widely 
acknowledged as the “contemporary culture of control” (�arland, 2001). In the early days 
of the new government talk was of rehabilitation and reform. It has become apparent that 
explicitly promoting community sentences as a genuine alternative (rather than as an 
addition) to prison is not politically possible. This is a shame. If our current penal ideology 
prioritises public protection, managing risk and the exclusion or ‘othering’ of those who 
commit crime, then it may in fact undermine any ‘rehabilitation revolution’, which many of 
the changes to service delivery were proposed to enable. Such a pressure has undoubtedly 
contributed to the huge expansion of the prison system and a Probation Service focused 
primarily on risk (Kemshell, 2002). Clearly, the delivery of services for offenders take place 
within a political and social context that is difficult to ignore. 
Who delivers justice services is a significant topic for discussion, demonstrated by the 
range of issues and arguments covered by the authors here. Who delivers really does 
matter. This collection of essays is our contribution to this important debate.
Conclusion
Vicki Helyar-Cardwell
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